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BIRTH CONTROL AS A LABOR LAW ISSUE 
LORRAINE SCHMALL* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The latest challenge to choice is at the local drugstore.  The century-long 
battle to give women the right to control their bodies and their working lives is 
far from over.  The most recent guardians of public morals are the local druggist, 
who may refuse to fill a prescription for contraceptives, and state legislators, 
who wish to reverse the long-standing and hard-won privilege to plan a family.  
In a democracy with majority rule and a plethora of rights and prohibitions, 
choices must always be weighed.  But those choices are too infrequently made 
by women.  Sounding like an early champion of choice, Justice Harlan wrote a 
separate opinion to Poe v. Ullman, an early birth-control decision, in which he 
argued: 
[T]he States . . . should be allowed broad scope in experimenting with various 
means of promoting [a wide variety of] policies, [but] “[t]here are limits to the 
extent to which a legislatively represented majority may conduct . . . 
experiments at the expense of the dignity and personality” of the individual.1 
Justice Harlan thus dissented from a case in which the Court refused to 
recognize that anti-obscenity laws should not infringe upon women’s rights to 
choose when and if they have children. 
It would be almost a decade after Justice Harlan’s dissent before the Court 
legalized birth control.  But long before and after the Court did so, laws were 
passed to guarantee that certain majoritarian rights were protected at the 
expense of women’s dignity and personality.  Because contraception was 
considered by many to be “obscene” and contrary to the morals of a free nation, 
it took women a century to get the lawful right to employ artificial methods of 
contraception.  Almost a half-century later, women are still trying to fully realize 
that right.2  In the way of that right are laws that allow doctors and hospitals to 
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 1. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 555 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma 
ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 546 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring)) (second ellipsis in original). 
 2. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (invalidating a Massachusetts statute that 
permitted married couples to use contraceptives, but prohibiting their use by unmarried persons); 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (invalidating a Connecticut statute that prohibited the 
use of birth control).  See also Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656 (2004) (The Court upheld a preliminary 
injunction against enforcement of the federal Child Online Protection Act, which criminalized 
commercial Internet postings that were harmful to minors unless the age of the recipient was 
verified.  Justice Breyer, Rehnquist and O’Connor dissented, voting that discussion about birth 
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refuse family-planning care; that give pharmacists the right to make moral 
choices to refuse to fill a prescription for emergency contraception; that permit 
employers to hire women at minimum wage without benefits, or, if there are 
benefits, to exclude coverage for contraceptives; that mandate family medical 
leaves but require women to foot the bill, since such leaves are without pay or 
benefits; that prohibit gender discrimination in employment but make private 
enforcement of such laws excessively difficult and prohibitively expensive; that 
prefer laissez-faire capitalism and allow workplaces to refuse to accommodate 
the needs of working mothers and allow women across the board to earn less 
than men; that fund, through outrageous tax breaks, corporate empires like Wal-
Mart that force their female workers to subsidize their low wages with food 
stamps and Medicaid.  Women in America deserve the right to compete in the 
marketplace without impediment.  Family planning is critical to the enjoyment 
of that right. 
Whatever progress women have made since the Supreme Court recognized 
their right to plan their own families is still threatened by an advancing 
assertion of the right to refuse birth control—by pharmacists, employers, Free-
Speech anti-choice activists, and anyone else whose moral views stand in the 
way of women’s family planning rights.  Additional impediments emanate from 
women’s historic and pervasive subordination.  The workplace, where women 
ought to be able to earn what they are worth to support themselves and their 
families, is still a battleground.  Women have not attained pay equity with men.  
They are less likely to be insured against health risks.  They work, or attempt to 
work, in a male normative workplace.  Women of color in the United States are 
least likely to have the ability to “execute their choices” because they are 
disproportionately impoverished, uninsured, and dependent upon public 
sources for their healthcare, which “ha[s] been systematically underfunded at 
the state and federal level.”3  To many, it is incomprehensible that 
“[g]uaranteeing the exercise of the right to reproductive health and family 
planning for all individuals and couples”4 is still a problem in the United States 
in this post-modern twenty-first century. 
Contraception is a multi-faceted issue.  Public health is clearly implicated.  
Preventing pregnancies improves the health and longevity of mothers while 
improving the lives and health of their children.  Such family planning more 
 
control falls outside the reach of the statute.); Steinberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000) (invalidating a 
Nebraska statute that criminalized partial birth abortions because the statute unduly burdened a 
woman’s right to choose); Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292 (1997) (upholding the two-day notice 
requirement of Montana’s Parental Notification of Abortion Act because the statute’s “judicial 
bypass” provisions allow an unemancipated minor to petition the state youth court to waive the 
notification requirement, satisfied constitutional requirements); Dalton v. Little Rock Family 
Planning Services, 516 U.S. 474 (1976) (upholding an Arkansas constitutional amendment that 
prohibited the use of state funds for any abortion, except to save the life of a mother). 
 3. Angela Hooton, A Broader Vision of the Reproductive Rights Movement: Fusing Mainstream and 
Latina Feminism, 13 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 59, 66 (2005). 
 4. Reproductive Rights, Family Planning: A Cornerstone of Control, UN CHRONICLE, Sept. 1994, at 
46, 46.  In 1994, the United Nations adopted the goal of expanding reproductive and family-planning 
rights as the major focus of the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development, 
noting that available and safe birth control has resulted in improved health for mothers and 
children.  Id. 
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humanely and efficiently fulfills the mandate to increase and multiply.  
Contraception is an ethical issue that surrounds the question of when human life 
begins.  According to the doctrine of some organized religions, birth control is a 
sin, and contraception is tantamount to abortion.  However, gender 
discrimination against women is implicit in government-endorsed attempts to 
deny access to birth control.  It was a man who first made contraception illegal 
in this country: A male Supreme Court ignored its necessity for so long.  The 
denial of contraception is an earmark of certain sexist cultures that relegate 
women to the hearth, the bedroom and the cradle, and is rooted in a desire to 
maintain the status quo of male hegemony.  But it is, at bottom, a labor law 
issue. 
Labor is the only variable that women control.  It is not within their power 
to change how other people think about and react to them.  It is the single 
sphere in which their competence, intelligence and industry actually make a 
difference.  Labor is the thing to which women can cling in order to maintain 
and advance as a class, while social norms, practices and codification change—
whether through revolution or evolution.  Doubly-employed as homemakers 
and wage earners, women cannot compete or advance in the marketplace 
without the ability to plan a family.  Nor can they afford to bear the expense of 
contraception when they earn so much less than men. 
It is interesting to begin with a look at the tortuous legal battle to recognize 
the constitutional right to contraception.  In juxtaposition—and perhaps 
inapposite—to that right is the legislated guarantee of freedom of conscience 
that has been interpreted to mean a person or corporation has the right to make 
moral refusals to serve a woman’s family-planning health needs.5  To examine 
women as consumers and paid employees requires a look at the jobs, salaries, 
benefits and working habits of women as a class.  A foray into a particular 
workplace, Wal-Mart, where women constitute an overwhelming majority of the 
workers, will exemplify the critical financial and employment disadvantage 
visited upon women by legal obstructions to birth control.  Finally, parsing the 
theoretical and constitutional bases for successful lawsuits challenging the 
exclusion of birth control from health insurance coverage reifies the legal deficits 
suffered by women whose right to plan a family is thwarted.  As one court 
found, excluding birth control from the risks against which companies chose to 
insure their employees defeats the purpose of civil rights law, which was “to 
end years of discrimination in employment and to place all men and women, 
 
 5. See, e.g., Church Amendment to the Health Programs Extension Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-
45, 87 Stat. 91(current version at 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7 (2000) (allowing individuals and medical facilities 
the right to decline the right to provide abortion and sterilization services based on moral or ethical 
grounds).  See generally, R. Alta Charo, The Celestial Fire of Conscience–Refusing to Deliver Medical Care, 
352 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2471 (2005) (“Finally, there is the awesome scale and scope of the abortion 
wars.  In the absence of legislative options for outright prohibition, abortion opponents search for 
proxy wars, using debates on research involving human embryos, the donation of organs from 
anencephalic neonates, and the right of persons in a persistent vegetative state to die as 
opportunities to rehearse arguments on the value of biologic but nonsentient human existence.  
Conscience clauses represent but another battle in these so-called culture wars.”).  See also 
GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF, REFUSING TO PROVIDE HEALTH SERVICES (2006), 
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_RPHS.pdf. 
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regardless of race, color, religion, or national origin, on equal footing in how 
they were treated in the workforce.”6 
II.  LEGALIZING AND PROTECTING CONTRACEPTION AS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT 
Some forms of artificial contraceptives have been legal since 1936.  
However, family planning has never been easy for women.  Modern history 
illustrates the criminal prohibitions, social and moral disapprobation, physical 
inaccessibility, and the complete absence of legal mandates for the provision of 
contraceptives.  Even despite their constitutional protections, women have 
found the pragmatics of birth control overwhelming at worst and daunting at 
best.  As the Supreme Court once observed: “Deeply embedded traditional ways 
of carrying out state policy . . .”—or not carrying it out—”are often tougher and 
truer law than the dead words of the written text.”7 
Birth control of any type was legal in the United States until 1873.  
Historians contend that the drive to illegalize all forms of birth control—which 
had always included abortion—was “spurred by a backlash against the 
women’s rights movements that reflected anxieties about women deserting their 
conventional positions as mothers.”8  Apparently, the driving force behind the 
original anti-birth control statutes was a New Yorker named Anthony 
Comstock.9  Born in 1844 in Connecticut, the state that proved to be the 
battleground for one of the most important struggles over access to birth control, 
Comstock moved to New York City after his service in the Civil War.  A self-
proclaimed Christian, the denizens of the country’s largest city caused him great 
consternation.  He became a type of one-man posse in the fight against what he 
perceived to be blatant immorality.  Among those matters that most enraged 
him and other strident members of anti-obscenity groups was the contraceptive 
industry.  Comstock was certain that the availability of contraceptives alone 
fostered and encouraged immorality.  Comstock authored his own anti-
obscenity bill, including a ban on contraceptives, which he managed to convince 
a majority of the United States Congress to adopt.  It bore his name, and 
emerged as the Comstock Act.10  The Act made it a misdemeanor to distribute 
contraceptive devices or drugs.11 
This and similar legislation adopted by several states remained 
unchallenged for decades until family-planning women’s rights activist 
Margaret Sanger forced judicial consideration of New York’s copycat law.  In 
 
 6. Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1269 (W.D. Wash. 2001). 
 7. Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. Browning, 310 U.S. 362, 369 (1940), cited in Poe v. 
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 502 (1961). 
 8. See LINDA GORDON, WOMAN’S BODY, WOMAN’S RIGHT: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF BIRTH CONTROL 
IN AMERICA 69 (rev. ed. 1990). 
 9. Public Broadcasting Service, People & Events: Anthony Comstock’s “Chastity” Laws, 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/pill/peopleevents/e_comstock.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2005). 
 10. Id.; see Comstock Act, ch. 258, § 2, 17 Stat. 599 (1873) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1461 
(2000)).  The statute defined contraceptives as obscene and illicit, making it a federal offense to 
disseminate birth control through the mail.  As Justice Harlan noted in Poe, the Comstock Law in its 
original form “started a fashion” and many states enacted similar legislation.  Poe, 367 U.S. at 547 
n.12 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 11. Comstock Act, ch. 258, § 2, 17 Stat. 599 (1873) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (2000)). 
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1916, Sanger was arrested for opening what some call the first birth control clinic 
in America.  She was convicted of violating the New York statute that made it a 
“misdemeanor for a person to sell, or give away, or to advertise or offer for sale, 
any instrument or article, drug or medicine, for the prevention of conception, or 
to give information orally, stating when, where, or how such an instrument, 
article, or medicine can be purchased or obtained.”12  Her conviction and 
sentence to thirty days in the city workhouse was affirmed, but in dicta, the 
court opined that licensed physicians were exempt from the law: 
This exception in behalf of physicians does not permit advertisements regarding 
such matters, nor promiscuous advice to patients irrespective of their condition, 
but it is broad enough to protect the physician who in good faith gives such help 
or advice to a married person to cure or prevent disease . . . . 
The protection thus afforded the physician would also extend to the druggist, or 
vendor, acting upon the physician’s prescription or order.13 
The New York Court of Appeals thus gave its imprimatur upon a reading of the 
law that allowed married women to use birth control for therapeutic purposes. 
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals relied on Sanger in 1936 in concluding 
that New York law exempted doctors from its law forbidding the distribution of 
contraceptives in United States v. One Package.14  The district court had dismissed 
the government’s prosecution of a long-practicing female gynecologist for 
receiving: 
[a] package containing pessaries [diaphragms] . . . sent to her by a physician in 
Japan for the purpose of trying them in her practice and giving her opinion as to 
their usefulness for contraceptive purposes.  She testified that she prescribes the 
use of pessaries in cases where it would not be desirable for a patient to 
undertake a pregnancy.  The accuracy and good faith of this testimony [was] not 
questioned.15 
Hardly strict constructionists, the appellate panel read the plain language of the 
tariff statute “prohibiting the importing or transporting in interstate commerce 
of articles ‘designed, adapted, or intended for preventing conception, or 
producing abortion,’” as incorporating the New York state court’s earlier 
interpretation of the Comstock Act, its progenitor, as removing physicians who 
operate lawfully from its strictures.16  Obviously more wed to originalism than 
his brethren, Judge Learned Hand chose not to dissent but wrote a short, 
separate opinion: 
There seems to me substantial reason for saying that contraceptives were meant 
to be forbidden, whether or not prescribed by physicians, and that no lawful use 
of them was contemplated.  Many people have changed their minds about such 
matters in sixty years, but the act forbids the same conduct now as then; a 
 
 12. People v. Sanger, 118 N.E. 637, 637 (N.Y. 1918). 
 13. Id. at 637-38. 
 14. 86 F.2d 737, 738 (2d Cir. 1936). 
 15. Id. at 738. 
 16. Id. at 739 (quoting then-current 18 U.S.C. § 396, current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1462 (2000)). 
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statute stands until public feeling gets enough momentum to change it, which 
may be long after a majority would repeal it, if a poll were taken.17 
Seven years later, in Tileston v. Ullman,18 the United States Supreme Court 
passed up an opportunity to consider the constitutionality of these Comstock 
laws.  It dismissed the appeal of a decision denying relief to a physician who 
sought to have the Connecticut statute “prohibiting the use of drugs or 
instruments to prevent conception, and the giving of assistance or counsel in 
their use” declared unconstitutional.19  The doctor argued that the statute would 
prevent his giving professional advice concerning the use of contraceptives “to 
three patients whose condition of health was such that their lives would be 
endangered by child-bearing.”20  He alleged that law enforcement officers of the 
state intended to prosecute him if he undertook to perform medically-necessary 
acts.  The Court rejected the physician’s right to challenge the law because he 
made: 
[n]o allegations asserting any claim under the Fourteenth Amendment of 
infringement of [his] liberty or his property rights. . . . 
[T]here is no allegation or proof that appellant’s life is in danger.  His patients 
are not parties to this proceeding and there is no basis on which we can say that 
he has standing to secure an adjudication of his patients’ constitutional right to 
life, which they do not assert in their own behalf.21 
Waiting an inexplicable twenty years, in Poe v. Ullman,22 another set of 
litigants attempted to have the Supreme Court consider that same Connecticut 
law.  The Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ cases, concluding that the cases did not 
present controversies justifying the adjudication of a constitutional issue.23  The 
complaints alleged that two plaintiffs, married women whose prior unsuccessful 
pregnancies rendered them in need of medical advice on the use of birth control 
for the protection of their health, were unable to get the care they needed from 
their physician, the third plaintiff, who was deterred from giving such advice.  
Once again, they averred the State’s intention to prosecute.  The Court did not 
address the standing issue, apparently because the plaintiffs included women 
whose lives were arguably at risk.  Instead, the Court dismissed on a ripeness 
issue.  It observed that the statutes in question had been enacted in 1879, that no 
one ever had been prosecuted thereunder except two doctors and a nurse—who 
were charged with operating a birth-control clinic—and that the information 
against them had been ultimately dismissed.24  Consequently, the Court found 
that the plaintiffs had not yet suffered a justiciable wrong.25 
 
 17. Id. at 740 (Hand, J., concurring). 
 18. 318 U.S. 44 (1943). 
 19. Id. at 45. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 45-46. 
 22. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961). 
 23. Id. at 508. 
 24. Id. at 501-02. 
 25. Id. at 509-10 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
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Justice Douglas was one of the dissenters.  He argued that his brethren 
should have decided the constitutionality of a state law that, even though rarely 
if ever enforced, denied birth control information to medically needy married 
couples.26  His comment about the law’s continued existence and tacit non-
enforcement rings true well into the twenty-first century, when some of the 
neediest have yet to be granted full and unhindered access to contraception: 
It may be, as some suggest, that these bizarre laws are kept on the books solely 
to insure that traffic in contraceptives will be furtive, or will be limited to those 
who, by the accident of their education, travels, or wealth, need not rely on local 
public clinics for instruction and supply.  Yet these laws—as the decision below 
shows—are not limited to such situations.27 
Although Justice Douglas agreed that states must reflect the views of their 
citizens, he feared that such anti-contraception laws interfered with a family’s 
privacy rights, as earlier recognized in cases like Meyer v. Nebraska and Pierce v. 
Society of the Sisters.28  Thus, he seemed to agree with Justice Harlan’s recognition 
that these laws “reached and passed” the limits to which the majority could 
regulate the individual.29 
Perhaps one of the last of the Comstock laws was finally declared 
unconstitutional in 1965 in Griswold v. Connecticut, in which a terse Justice 
Douglas wrote that emanations from the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments to 
the United States Constitution, and the penumbral guarantee of the Ninth 
Amendment, demanded such a result: 
[I]t concerns a law which, in forbidding the use of contraceptives rather than 
regulating their manufacture or sale, seeks to achieve its goals by means having 
a maximum destructive impact upon [a married] relationship. . . .  Would we 
allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale 
signs of the use of contraceptives?  The very idea is repulsive to the notions of 
privacy surrounding the marriage relationship.30 
In a paean to matrimony he continued: 
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights—older than our 
political parties, older than our school system.  Marriage is a coming together for 
 
 26. Id. at 510 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 27. Id. at 511 n.2 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 28. Repeating the descriptions of the cases as presented by dissenter Justice Douglas in Poe, 367 
U.S. at 517, the concurring justices in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) stated: 
This Court recognized in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), that the right ‘to marry, 
establish a home and bring up children’ was an essential part of the liberty guaranteed by 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  262 U.S. at 399.  In Pierce v. Society of the Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 
(1925), the Court held unconstitutional an Oregon Act which forbade parents from 
sending their children to private schools because such an act ‘unreasonably interferes with 
the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children 
under their control.’ 268 U.S. at 534-35.  As this Court said in Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 
U.S. 158, 166 (1944), the Meyer and Pierce decisions ‘have respected the private realm of 
family life which the state cannot enter.’ 
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 495 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (citations added). 
 29. Poe, 367 U.S. at 555 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 
316 U.S. 535, 546 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring)) (ellipsis in original). 
 30. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86 (emphasis added). 
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better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being 
sacred.  It is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in 
living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects.  
Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior 
decisions.31 
Seven years later in Eisenstadt v. Baird, a Massachusetts law was challenged 
by a family planning lecturer who gave contraceptive foam to an unmarried 
woman after speaking to a group of students about birth control.32  The 
defendant, Baird, invited arrest from the podium.  He was eventually convicted 
of a felony under a law that allowed only doctors and pharmacists to dispense 
contraceptives, and even then, only to married people.  The Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts had found the state acted lawfully in pursuit of its 
interest in protecting the health of its citizens: The court had declared that the 
prohibition in the Massachusetts law in question was directly related to the 
State’s goal of “prevent[ing] the distribution of articles designed to prevent 
conception which may have undesirable, if not dangerous, physical 
consequences.”33  In a subsequent decision in the same court, Sturgis v. Attorney 
General,34 a judge found “a second and more compelling ground for upholding 
the same statute”—namely, to protect morals through “regulating the private 
sexual lives of single persons,” concluding that “the discouraging of extra-
marital relations is ‘admittedly a legitimate subject of state concern.’”35  The 
court found a rational basis for the statutory prohibitions.36 
Examining the Massachusetts statute on certiorari, the Supreme Court 
disagreed, concluding that even a lenient reading of the Equal Protection Clause 
invalidated the law, since it gleaned no reason to distinguish between single and 
married people.37  It also remarked, in a prescient recognition of the pragmatic 
result, that “[i]t would be plainly unreasonable to assume that Massachusetts 
has prescribed pregnancy and the birth of an unwanted child as punishment for 
fornication, which is a misdemeanor under [Massachusetts law].”38  Taking 
judicial notice of widely-known empirical data, the Court rejected another 
argument as nonsensical: 
Appellants suggest that the purpose of the Massachusetts statute is to promote 
marital fidelity as well as to discourage premarital sex.  Under [the statute], 
however, contraceptives may be made available to married persons without 
regard to whether they are living with their spouses or the uses to which the 
contraceptives are to be put.  Plainly the legislation has no deterrent effect on 
extramarital sexual relations.39 
 
 31. Id. at 486. 
 32. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 440 (1972). 
 33. Commonwealth v. Baird, 247 N.E.2d 574, 578 (Mass. 1969). 
 34. 260 N.E.2d 687 (Mass. 1970). 
 35. Id. at 690 (quoting Griswold, 381 U.S. at 489). 
 36. Id. at 690-91.  The court also took note of the legislature’s concern over “long range 
mutagenic and carcinogenic side effects” of contraceptives.  Id. at 689. 
 37. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 443. 
 38. Id. at 448. 
 39. Id. at 442 n.3. 
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Citing Eisenstadt v. Baird for the proposition that “[i]f the right of privacy 
means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free of 
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a 
person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child,”40 the Court decided in 
Carey v. Population Services International that contraceptive devices could legally 
be distributed by persons other than pharmacists—even to minors.41  The Court 
found fallacious the state’s argument that the Supreme Court “ha[d] not 
accorded a ‘right of access to contraceptives’ the status of a fundamental aspect 
of personal liberty.”42  It explained that: 
Griswold may no longer be read as holding only that a State may not prohibit a 
married couple’s use of contraceptives.  Read in light of its progeny, the 
teaching of Griswold is that the Constitution protects individual decisions in 
matters of childbearing from unjustified intrusion by the State. 
Restrictions on the distribution of contraceptives clearly burden the freedom to 
make such decisions.  A total prohibition against the sale of contraceptives, for 
example, would intrude upon individual decisions in matters of procreation and 
contraception as harshly as a direct ban on their use.  Indeed, in practice, a 
prohibition against all sales, since more easily and less offensively enforced, 
might have an even more devastating effect upon the freedom to choose 
contraception.”43 
The Court continued to refine its definition of the right to make personal 
decisions about childbearing.  It decided that access to family planning includes 
the right of persons to send and receive information about contraception.  In 
Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp.,44 the Court invalidated a federal law which 
prohibited the mailing of unsolicited advertisements for contraceptives.  
Petitioner sought a declaratory judgment when it was informed by the United 
States Postal Service that its mass mailings to members of the public violated the 
law. 
Youngs presented two examples of its mailings.  The first, entitled Condoms 
and Human Sexuality, was a twelve-page pamphlet describing the use, 
manufacture, desirability, and availability of condoms, and providing detailed 
descriptions of various condoms manufactured by the petitioner.  The second, 
entitled Plain Talk about Venereal Disease, was a shorter pamphlet about the use 
and advantages of condoms in aiding the prevention of venereal disease.  At the 
bottom of the last page was a statement that the pamphlet was distributed “as a 
public service by Youngs, the distributor of Trojan-brand prophylactics.”45  The 
government argued that Youngs’ mailings were unprotected commercial 
speech.  The Court held, to the contrary, “advertising for contraceptives not only 
implicates ‘substantial individual and societal interests’ in the free flow of 
commercial information, but also relates to activity which is protected from 
 
 40. Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977) (quoting Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453). 
 41. Id. at 690-91, 693. 
 42. Id. at 686. 
 43. Id. at 687-88. 
 44. 463 U.S. 60 (1983). 
 45. Id. at 62 n.4. 
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unwarranted state interference."46  Citing its decision in Carey, the Court 
concluded that “where—as in this case—a speaker desires to convey truthful 
information relevant to important social issues such as family planning and the 
prevention of venereal disease, we have previously found the First Amendment 
interest served by such speech paramount.”47  Beyond that, the Court reiterated 
its commitment to the rights of parents to discuss and provide contraceptives to 
their children.48  As had an earlier Court, this bench became practical about birth 
control: 
Yet it cannot go without notice that adolescent children apparently have a 
pressing need for information about contraception.  Available data indicate that, 
in 1978, over one-third of all females aged 13-19 (approximately five million 
people) were sexually active. . . . Approximately 30% of these sexually active 
teenage females became pregnant during 1978; over 70% of these pregnancies 
(roughly 1.2 million) were unintended.  Almost half a million teenagers had 
abortions during 1978.49 
The right to an abortion was constitutionally recognized in Roe v. Wade in 1973.50  
Since then, there have been scores more abortion cases heard by the Supreme 
Court.  Roe invalidated a nineteenth century Texas criminal statute prohibiting 
abortion except in cases where necessary to preserve maternal life, on the basis 
that the right of privacy secured by the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment includes a fundamental right to decide whether to bring a 
pregnancy to term.51  The decision has been challenged since its publication, and 
some fear that it will be reversed.  Only forty-seven percent of surveyed 
Americans think that most abortion will still be legal by the end of George W. 
Bush’s second term in office.52 
Abortion remains controversial; the issue has made and broken political 
aspirations.  And it is one of the most litigated of the so-called fundamental 
rights.53  It is possible that the multiple challenges to a woman’s right to 
 
 46. Id. at 69 (quoting Carey, 431 U.S. at 700). 
 47. Id. (citing Carey, 431 U.S. at 700-01). 
 48. See Carey, 431 U.S. at 708 (stating that a provision prohibiting parents from distributing 
contraceptives to children constitutes “direct interference with . . . parental guidance”); cf. Bolger, 463 
U.S. at 75 (“Because the proscribed information ‘may bear on one of the most important decisions’ 
parents have a right to make, the restriction of  ‘the free flow of truthful information’ constitutes a 
‘basic’ constitutional defect regardless of the strength of the government’s interest.”) (quoting 
Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 95-96 (1977)). 
 49. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 74 n.30.  
 50. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 51. See id. 
 52. PollingReport.com, Abortion and Birth Control, CBS News/New York Times Poll (Jan. 14-
18, 2005), http://www.pollingreport.com/abortion.htm. 
 53. See Scheidler v. National Organization for Women, Inc., Nos. 04-1244 and 04-1352, 2006 U.S. 
LEXIS 2022 (U.S. Feb. 28, 2006) (deciding after remand that anti-abortion protesters are not 
precluded by the Hobbs Act from engaging even in physical violence).  For a discussion of the recent 
attempt by several state legislature to ban abortions, see Sarah Baxter, US States Join Abortion Revolt 
To Bring Back Ban, SUNDAY TIMES (London), Mar. 5, 2006, at 29 (“Inspired by President George W 
Bush’s appointment of two conservative justices, John Roberts and Samuel Alito, to the Supreme 
Court, several states have seized the opportunity to overturn their local laws.”).  South Dakota’s 
legislature passed a bill banning most abortions, making no exception for even rape and incest 
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victims; Mississippi is considering a ban with exceptions if the mother’s life is in danger or if she is a 
victim of rape or incest; and there is a move for legislation in Missouri, Ohio, Indiana, Tennessee, 
West Virginia and Kentucky.  Id. 
In refusing for a second time to hear a challenge to South Carolina’s abortion clinic regulations, 
Greenville Women’s Clinic v. Commissioner, 538 U.S. 1008 (2003), the U.S. Supreme Court let stand a 
lower court ruling that the regulations are constitutional. 
In Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000), the Court upheld a Colorado law placing restrictions on 
abortion clinic demonstrations.  The “bubble” law creates an eight-foot buffer around persons 
entering abortion facilities. 
In Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000), the Court overturned a Nebraska law banning partial 
birth abortions.  The decision altered their decision in Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), and expanded the 
health exception.  Those dissenting included Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. 
In Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292 (1997), the Court upheld Montana’s parental notification 
statue that included a judicial bypass. 
In Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968 (1997), the Supreme Court upheld a Montana statute that 
specifically disqualified physician assistants from performing abortions. 
In Schenk v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357 (1997), the Supreme Court ruled that “floating buffer 
zones” around abortion clinics limit free speech, and are therefore unconstitutional.  However, the 
Court ruled that a fixed buffer zone is constitutional.  An area of fifteen feet from the clinic entrance 
may remain “off grounds” to demonstrators. 
In Dalton v. Little Rock Family Planning Services, 516 U.S. 474 (1996), part of Arkansas’ constitutional 
amendment prohibiting the use of State funds to pay for any abortion except to save the mother’s 
life, had to be enjoined insofar as it conflicted with federal law allowing abortion funding for rape 
and incest victims. 
In Leavitt v. Jane, 518 U.S. 137 (1996), the Supreme Court held that part of an Idaho statute limiting 
circumstances for abortions after twenty weeks was constitutional. 
In Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, 512 U.S. 753 (1994), an injunction prohibiting pro-lifers from 
entering a thirty-six foot buffer zone around the entrance of an abortion facility was upheld by the 
Court.  The Court found that the injunction was directed at the protestors’ conduct, not their speech 
content, and did not violate the First Amendment. 
In Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263 (1993), the Court ruled five to four that the 
anti-Ku Klux Klan Act of 1872 could not be applied to pro-life protestors since opposition to abortion 
is not a form of discrimination against a class of persons. 
In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), the Court upheld Pennsylvania abortion 
regulations on informed consent requirements, parental consent, twenty-four-hour waiting periods, 
and abortion reporting.  In a five-to-four split, the Court struck down the spousal notification law 
and reaffirmed Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
In Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991), the Court stated that federal guidelines prohibiting the use 
of federal monies for counseling and referrals for abortions were constitutional. 
In Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990), the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution requires that a law mandating that both parents of an underage girl be notified before 
an abortion is performed on her is permissible only if it includes a provision that a judge may make 
exceptions on various grounds. The law may require a forty-eight-hour waiting period between 
notification and the performance of the abortion to give the parents a realistic opportunity to talk to 
the daughter. 
The Court held in Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990), that a state may 
require a doctor to notify the parents of an underage girl before performing an abortion on her, 
provided that the law allows a judge to make exceptions and authorize an abortion without 
informing the parents whenever the judge believes that it would be in the girl’s best interests. 
In Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989), the Supreme Court upheld a Missouri 
statute regulating abortion requirements for viability tests after twenty weeks.  The Court provided 
the state with new authority to limit abortions in the areas of public funding and post-viability 
abortions. 
In Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988), the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the 
Adolescent Family Life Act (AFTL), which prohibits funding to programs that perform, counsel or 
07_SCHMALL.DOC 4/28/2006  8:56 AM 
150 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 13:139 2006 
 
(with narrow exceptions) refer for abortions.  The Act also requires promotion of adoption as an 
alternative to abortion. 
In Bower v. American Hospital Ass’n, 476 U.S. 610 (1986), the Court struck down Reagan 
Administration regulations (based upon the 1973 Rehabilitation Act known as the Baby Doe 
Regulations) which were intended to prevent discriminatory non-treatment of handicapped 
newborn infants.  The Court relied heavily upon the right of parents to refuse treatment for their 
children. 
In Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986), the Supreme 
Court invalidated the provisions of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act concerning informed 
consent, informational reporting, and protection of viable unborn children. 
In City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983), the Supreme Court 
ruled unconstitutional the requirement that abortions after twelve weeks (or the first trimester) of 
pregnancy be performed in a hospital.  The invalidated law also required consent of parents for all 
abortions performed on minors under the age of fifteen; mandated that detailed information on 
medical risks of abortion, fetal development and abortion alternatives be given to women prior to 
abortions; and required a twenty-four hour waiting period between receipt of the required 
information and performance of the abortion.  It also provided that the remains of the aborted baby 
be disposed of “in a humane and sanitary manner.”  Id. at 424. 
In Planned Parenthood Assoc. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983), the Supreme Court upheld the 
following requirements: a pathology report for each abortion, the presence of a second physician at 
post-viability abortions, and parental or juvenile court consent for minors seeking an abortion. 
In H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981), the Court upheld a Utah statute requiring that the parents 
of an unemancipated minor be informed by a physician, if possible, before the physician performs an 
abortion on such minor. 
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) and Williams v. Zbaraz, 448 U.S. 358 (1980) upheld the Hyde 
Amendment, restricting the use of federal funds for abortion to those necessary to preserve the life 
of the mother.  The amendment was challenged as a denial of due process, equal protection and 
freedom of religion, and as an establishment of Roman Catholic dogma in violation of the First 
Amendment.  The federal government may refuse to pay for abortions for welfare women.  In 
addition, states are under no obligation to pay for such abortions if federal funds for reimbursement 
are withdrawn. 
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) invalidated a Massachusetts statute requiring parental consent.  
The states requiring the consent of parents to abortions upon a minor must afford such minor an 
alternative opportunity for authorization of the abortion where the minor may attempt to 
demonstrate that either she is mature enough to make her own decision, or that the abortion would 
be in her best interests. 
Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979) invalidated a Pennsylvania statute that created standards 
for determination of viability of the unborn child.  A state may not require doctors performing 
abortions to protect the life of the fetus even if such doctors have reason to believe the fetus might 
survive the abortion. 
Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977) held that a Pennsylvania statute allowing the use of Medicaid funds 
only for abortions that are “medically necessary” does not violate Title XIX of the Social Security Act. 
In Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977), the Court considered a Connecticut regulation restricting the 
use of Medicaid funds to those abortions that are “medically necessary.”  The Court held the law 
does not deny due process and equal protection, since the State is free to use its power of funding to 
encourage childbirth over abortion. 
Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977) upheld a St. Louis policy against the performance of abortion in 
public hospitals.  A city may choose to provide publicly financed hospital services for childbirth, 
while choosing to bar abortions in its public hospitals. 
In Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976), the Supreme Court held that a wife may 
obtain an abortion without her husband’s consent and, in most instances, even without his 
knowledge.  The Court also held that all state laws requiring the parents’ consent before an abortion 
is performed on their minor daughter are invalid. 
In Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976), the Court held that physicians may challenge abortion 
funding restrictions on behalf of their female patients seeking abortions. 
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abortion, or to laws that in some way limit that right, have detracted from a 
consistent legal approach to securing and protecting other, more basic rights for 
a much larger number of women, such as the right to equal pay for equal work.54 
Law professor Catharine MacKinnon shocked some sensibilities when she 
argued that men’s need to dominate, and society’s approval of that domination, 
explains why women make, and mean, less.55  Accordingly, women must meet 
men’s standards, rather than be measured against a unique female standard.  
The standards are arbitrary and probably wrong.56  Standards and principles 
that appear to be gender neutral, are in fact, according to MacKinnon, designed 
to create and maintain male advantage: 
Men’s physiology defines most sports, their needs define auto and health 
insurance coverage, their socially designed biographies define workplace 
expectations and successful career patterns, their perspectives and concerns 
define quality in scholarship, their experiences and obsessions define merit, 
their objectification of life defines art, their military service defines citizenship, 
their presence defines family, their inability to get along with each other—their 
wars and rulerships—defines history, their image defines god, and their genitals 
define sex.57 
The debate about women, their differences, and the best approach to 
equality in all aspects of life will continue.  Resolution of such antecedent and 
perhaps immortal issues will take the rest of all our lives.  But the irrebuttable 
evidence of discrimination cannot be ignored simply because the rhetorical 
questions remain.  A myriad of lawsuits and centuries of litigation have led to 
some victories for women.  The theoretical bases for the complaints range from 
Equal Protection under the United States Constitution, written by men and 
specifically excluding women and blacks from important rights of citizenship—
and even full existence—to statutory claims that protect against specific types of 
discrimination, for example, against pregnant women.  There is a host of 
 
In Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975), the Supreme Court invalidated a state ban on advertising 
for abortion. 
In Connecticut v. Menillo, 423 U.S. 9 (1975), the Court upheld a Connecticut anti-abortion statute as 
it applied to non-physicians. 
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) invalidated a Georgia “reform” abortion statute that permitted 
abortion where continued pregnancy would endanger the woman’s life or health, where the fetus 
would likely be born with a serious defect, or where pregnancy resulted from rape.  The statute also 
required that abortion be performed in an accredited hospital, and that two physicians confirm the 
performing physician’s judgment of necessity for the abortion. 
 54. See Hooton, supra note 3, at 61 (“[O]n a practical level, the [white feminist] movement has 
dedicated most of its energy and resources toward keeping abortion legal.”). 
 55. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 36 
(1987). 
 56. See David B. Cruz, Disestablishing Sex and Gender, 90 CAL. L. REV. 997 (2002) (stating that legal 
conclusions that gender differences justify different treatment are not only wrong, but are also based 
on some arbitrary and oversimplified understanding of what gender means); Peggie R. Smith, Elder 
Care, Gender and Work: The Work-Family Issue of the 21st Century, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 351 
(2004); see also ARLIE HOCHSCHILD WITH ANNE MACHUNG, THE SECOND SHIFT: WORKING PARENTS 
AND THE REVOLUTION AT HOME (1989); JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND 
WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2000). 
 57. MACKINNON, supra note 55, at 36. 
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benefits, remedies, statutory and constitutional rights, and even affirmative 
action that women have enjoyed since achieving full citizenship.  But as a class, 
assuming and accepting that biological females do not possess identical and 
immutable characteristics,58 women have not arrived. 
Legal advocacy has spurred most, if not all, changes in contraceptive 
accessibility.  But, like Shakespeare’s Portia, who had to dress like a man to save 
her father’s skin in a court of law, women were late in being allowed to do their 
own litigating.  In 1872, the Supreme Court decided that Illinois could lawfully 
deny admission to the state bar to Myra Bradwell because the right to practice 
law was not a privilege and immunity guaranteed by the Constitution.59  
Consequently, the state law prohibiting women from entering or making legal 
contracts, which obviated the ability to practice law, was not unconstitutional.  
Eschewing less opaque and more politically correct jurisprudential language, 
the Illinois Supreme Court wrote: 
[W]hile we are constrained to refuse this application, we respect the motive 
which prompts it, and we entertain a profound sympathy with those whose 
efforts which are being so widely made to reasonably enlarge the field for the 
exercise of woman’s industry and talent.  While those theories, which are 
popularly known as “woman’s rights” can not be expected to meet with a very 
cordial acceptance among the members of a profession, which, more than any 
other, inclines its followers, if not to stand immovable upon the ancient ways, at 
least to make no hot haste in measures of reform, still, all right minded men 
must gladly see new spheres of action opened to woman, and greater 
inducements offered her to seek the highest and widest culture.60 
III.  ONE MAN’S CONSCIENCE AND ANOTHER MAN’S PREGNANT WIFE 
On June 8, 2005, Fitzgerald Pharmacy, which operates two small 
independent drug stores in central Illinois,61 filed a lawsuit alleging that the 
governor of Illinois and the directors of two departments of professional 
regulation violated the statutory and constitutional rights of conscientiously 
objecting pharmacists by issuing an emergency rule requiring all pharmacists to 
fill prescriptions for contraceptives, including those considered emergency 
contraception.62  Governor Rod Blagojevich, after being told that a Chicago 
pharmacist refused to fill an order because of moral opposition to contraception, 
 
 58. See, e.g., Elvia Rosales Arriola, Sexual Identity and the Constitution: Homosexual Persons as a 
Discrete and Insular Minority, 14 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 263, 275 (1992) (stating that, to be considered a 
suspect class under the law, a social group generally must possess identical and immutable 
characteristics). 
 59. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 139 (1872). 
 60. In re Bradwell, 55 Ill. 535, 541-42 (1876). 
 61. Prophetstown, Illinois, has a population of 2023 and more than half the households have 
income of less than $45,000 per year.  AreaGuides.net, Prophetstown Demographics, 
http://prophetstownil. areaguides.net/census.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2005).  Morrison, Illinois, 
has a total population of 4447.  Almost two-thirds of the households have income of less than 
$45,000.  AreaGuides.net, Morrison Demographics, http://morrisonil.areaguides.net/census.html 
(last visited Nov. 20, 2005). 
 62. See Complaint, Morr-Fitz, Inc. v. Blagojevich (Cir. Ct. of Sangamon County, Ill., Sept. 14, 
2005), available at http://www.aul.org/ilroc/complaint-2005.9.14.pdf. 
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had reacted quickly with the new rule: “Our regulation says that if a woman 
goes to a pharmacy with a prescription for birth control, the pharmacy or the 
pharmacist is not allowed to discriminate or to choose who he sells it to,” 
Blagojevich said, “[n]o delays.  No hassles.  No lectures.”63  Under the new rule, 
if a pharmacist does not fill the prescription because of a moral objection, 
another pharmacist must be available to do so.  The jury is still out on whether 
that regulation, an obviously critical one, will be allowed to continue to exist.  
Illinois is not the first state to mandate that a doctor’s prescriptions be filled.64  
But this latest challenge to women’s access involves unbearably heavy 
transaction costs. 65 
The American Medical Association favors such laws,66 and its members 
have written their own statement in favor, particularly, of access to emergency 
contraception.67  But a group touted as the nation’s largest faith-based 
 
 63. Abdon M. Pallasch, Sell Contraceptives, Gov Orders Druggists, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Apr. 2, 
2005, at A1.  The April 1, 2005 “Emergency Rule” is codified at ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 68, § 1330.91(j) 
(2005). 
 64. According to the Alan Guttmacher Institute, Nevada already has a law and at least a half 
dozen states have bills pending.  See Cynthia Dailard, Beyond the Issue of Pharmacist Refusals: 
Pharmacies that Won’t Sell Emergency Contraception, GUTTMACHER REP. ON PUB. POL’Y, Aug. 2005, at 
10, available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/tgr/08/3/gr080310.pdf. 
 65. See Equity in Prescription Insurance and Contraceptive Coverage Act of 1997, H.R. 2174, 
105th Cong. § 2 (1997) (congressional findings).  In 1999, contraceptive prescription coverage was 
made mandatory under the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program, 105 Cong. Rec. S9193 
(1998) (enacted). 
 66. AM. MED. ASS’N HOUSE OF DELEGATES, AMA-YPS DELEGATE’S REPORT 2 (2005), available at 
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/17/a2005delegatesreport.pdf. 
(“Whereas, Recent news reports have stated that both pharmacy chains and individual 
pharmacists have begun refusing to fill prescriptions for oral contraceptives (either for use as 
emergency contraception or for use as ongoing contraception) based on their religious and/or 
ethical beliefs; and 
Whereas, Reports have included stories of pharmacists confiscating the prescriptions, thus 
preventing the patient from filling the prescription at another pharmacy in a timely manner; and 
Whereas, This approach by pharmacists may jeopardize a patient’s health, may compromise the 
patient-physician relationship, and could be construed to be a form of discrimination and/or a 
change in the pharmacist’s scope of practice; and 
Whereas, Several states have passed or are trying to pass legislation in this regard; therefore be it 
RESOLVED, That our American Medical Association work with the American Pharmaceutical 
Association to ensure that pharmacies and pharmacists set up systems which guarantee patient 
access to legal pharmaceuticals without unnecessary delay or interference (Directive to Take Action); 
and be it further 
RESOLVED, That our AMA support legislation which requires individual pharmacists or 
pharmacy chains to fill legally written prescriptions or to provide immediate alternative access 
without interference.”). 
 67. AM. MED. ASS’N, AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION POLICY COMPENDIUM H-75.985 ACCESS 
TO EMERGENCY CONTRACEPTION (2005), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/ 
mm/19/policycompendium2005.pdf (“It is the policy of our AMA: (1) that physicians and other 
health care professionals should be encouraged to play a more active role in providing education 
about emergency contraception, including access and informed consent issues, by discussing it as 
part of routine family planning and contraceptive counseling; (2) to enhance efforts to expand access 
to emergency contraception, including making emergency contraception pills more readily available 
through pharmacies, hospitals, clinics, emergency rooms, acute care centers, and physicians’ offices; 
(3) to recognize that information about emergency contraception is part of the comprehensive 
07_SCHMALL.DOC 4/28/2006  8:56 AM 
154 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 13:139 2006 
organization of physicians disagrees with the AMA.  The Christian Medical 
Association’s Associate Executive Director, Dr. Gene Rudd, an obstetrician-
gynecologist, believes druggists ought to be able to refuse to fill such 
prescriptions.  He argues: “The key issue here is not even the important question 
of the ethics of birth control, but the fundamental freedom to follow the dictates 
of one’s conscience and the teachings of one’s religious faith.”68 
We are still, as Justice Harlan noted, “experimenting with various means of 
promoting [a wide variety of] policies.”69  Currently, under federal and state 
conscience clause legislation, individuals and institutions are protected from 
performing medical procedures to which they object, or filling prescriptions 
where doing so would violate their corporate or personal consciences.  Even 
where states have passed insurance laws that require general health policies to 
cover birth control, their legislative strictures are not absolute.  Thirteen states 
include an exemption for employers who object to such coverage for religious 
reasons.70  Three states include coverage exemptions for insurers affiliated with 
religious organizations in their policies.71  Four states have laws that permit 
pharmacists to refuse to fill prescriptions based on their personal beliefs, and 
representatives in ten states have introduced similar bills.72 
During the debates preceding the passage of certain anti-abortion 
legislation that allowed federally-funded health care professionals and 
institutions to refuse to perform abortions or sterilizations contrary to their 
religious or moral beliefs, Senator Frank Church introduced an amendment that 
would bear his name, the Church Amendment.73  The Church Amendment 
created a positive right of religious hospitals to follow their corporate 
consciences and refuse, through their staff, to provide care.  That has come to 
mean that a religious hospital or clinic can deny services that are contrary to the 
tenets of its sponsoring religious health care organization, or contrary to the 
“religious beliefs or moral convictions”74 of any staff member. 
This Church Amendment was one of a myriad of laws introduced, and one 
of the several passed, by Congress shortly after the Supreme Court decided Roe 
 
information to be provided as part of the emergency treatment of sexual assault victims; (4) to 
support educational programs for physicians and patients regarding treatment options for the 
emergency treatment of sexual assault victims, including information about emergency 
contraception; and (5) to encourage writing advance prescriptions for these pills as requested by 
their patients until the pills are available over-the-counter.”). 
 68. News Release, Christian Med. and Dental Ass’n, CMA Doctors Counter AMA Position on 
Abortion and Conscience (June 27, 2005), http://cmdahome.org/index.cgi?BISKIT=590475168& 
CONTEXT=art&art=3025. 
 69. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 555 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 70. Including Arizona, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Maine, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Missouri, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, and Rhode Island.  See NAT’L 
WOMEN’S LAW CTR., CONTRACEPTIVE EQUITY LAW IN YOUR STATE: KNOW YOUR RIGHTS—USE YOUR 
RIGHTS 2-34 (2003), available at http://www.nwlc.org/pdf/concovstateguide2003.pdf. 
 71. Id. (Missouri, Nevada, and Texas). 
 72. See NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., DON’T TAKE “NO” FOR AN ANSWER (2005), available at 
http://www.nwlc.org/pdf/8-2005_DontTakeNo1.pdf. 
 73. Leora Eisenstadt, Separation of Church and Hospital: Strategies to Protect Pro-Choice Physicians 
in Religiously Affiliated Hospitals, 15 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 135, 144-45 (2003). 
 74. 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(e) (2000). 
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v. Wade.75  The practical result of such corporate conscience following is that 
“access to abortions and other legal and often essential health care services is 
severely restricted for thousands of women.”76  The conscience clause survived 
constitutional scrutiny and challenges that the law unconstitutionally 
“established” religion.77  Protecting the religious freedom of those with moral 
objections to medical procedures such as sterilization, according to the court, 
actually preserved the “government[‘s] neutrality in the face of religious 
differences” since it did not “affirmatively prefer[] one religion over another.”78  
The Supreme Court has noted the national “commitment to individual freedom 
of conscience in matters of religious belief.”79  Although the amendment may not 
violate the Establishment Clause, it has not yet been measured against the 
judicially-recognized fundamental right of a woman to make personal family 
decisions. 
In 1997, Congress expanded conscience clause protection, so that Medicaid-
managed care organizations could refuse to provide services or referrals for 
services they objected to on moral and religious grounds.80  However, like all 
First Amendment issues, religious objections and preferences are never absolute.  
Courts always have to do some balancing.81  Ironically, the Constitution does not 
require religious exemptions or conscience clauses.  Such clauses exist because 
state legislatures created them.82  No one would argue with the assertion that the 
Constitution allows everyone to hold different beliefs, but serving or not serving 
another citizen based on those beliefs implicates more than the pure 
belief/speech rights protected by the First Amendment.  While some 
pharmacists and other medical professionals currently have the right to refuse to 
provide their personal services, following one’s conscience in other contexts has 
been found to violate the law.  For example, in Smith v. Fair Employment and 
 
 75. See Eisenstadt, supra note 73, at 146. 
 76. Id. at 138 (noting that hospital mergers over the last few decades have led to sectarian, and 
often Catholic, health care “mega systems”). 
 77. See Chrisman v. Sisters of St. Joseph of Peace, 506 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1974) (holding that 
religious hospitals that receive federal funds can refuse to perform sterilizations without violating 
the Establishment Clause of the Constitution). 
 78. Id. at 311. 
 79. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 
483 U.S. 327, 341 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring) (The Court held that religious institutions are 
exempt from the nondiscrimination provisions of § 702 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e-1 (2000) with respect to hiring their own employees.). 
 80. 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-2(b)(3)(B) (2000).  In 1996, Congress passed the Coats Amendment, 
legislation that prohibits the government from discriminating against medical residency programs 
that lose accreditation because they fail to provide abortion training.  42 U.S.C. § 238n(b)(1) (2000). 
 81. More recent jurisprudence replaces the traditional balancing test with one that determines 
whether the law in question targets religion or simply affects it as a consequence of being generally 
applicable to a broad set of actors.  See, e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding 
that the First Amendment does not require religious exemptions to laws of general applicability and 
it is permissible to impose penalties on Native Americans who use peyote as part of their religious 
practices). 
 82. See Iniami M. Chettiar, Comment, Contraceptive Laws: Eliminating Gender Discrimination or 
Infringing on Religious Liberties?, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1867 (2002) (observing that the Supreme Court has 
found laws that do not provide a religious exemption constitutional). 
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Housing Commission,83 the California Supreme Court upheld a state law that 
prohibited housing discrimination against unmarried persons, despite a strong 
protest by a landlord who refused to rent to couples “living in sin.”84  The 
landlord argued that renting to a non-married cohabiting couple violated her 
religious beliefs.85  The court found that the landlord’s practice of religion was 
not substantially burdened, since, in theory, she could sell the property and earn 
income through other means.86  Even more relevant to the current debate about 
the religious and moral clash between the pharmacist who will not dispense 
contraceptives and women who want and need them, the court took special note 
that “the parties have not brought to our attention a single case in which the 
Supreme Court exempted a religious objector from the operation of a general 
law when the exemption would detrimentally affect the rights of third parties.”87  
As the California Supreme Court found, the statute in question was “both 
generally applicable and neutral towards religion.”88  To date, no one has 
challenged conscience clauses on such grounds. 
If there is a workable test for challenging conscience clauses―or their 
antitheses, pharmacist mandates―it is one where such laws, when they are 
neither neutral nor of general application, must survive strict scrutiny.89  In cases 
where strict scrutiny is the standard of review, proponents of the law must both 
demonstrate a compelling interest and that interest must be narrowly tailored.  
Arguably, the court would find the need for emergency birth control 
compelling, because the rights to contraception and abortion are constitutionally 
protected.  As with all constitutional language, the precise parameters continue 
to evolve.  The relationship between adherence to one’s faith, and the division 
between belief, which is absolute, and practice, which is not absolute, has long 
vexed federal courts.  Two cases involving bald eagles, where the operational 
definitions of a state’s compelling interests survived strict scrutiny, are 
instructive to determining whether pharmacist mandates are constitutional.  In 
each case, a federal court allowed an intrusion on the practice of religion where 
the government had a compelling interest in so doing.90 
In the first case, U.S. v. Lundquist, the defendant, a non-Indian who 
practiced Native American religions as part of “his deeply and sincerely held 
religious beliefs,”91  was charged with criminal possession of protected bird 
feathers.  Lundquist’s conviction was upheld.  In the second case, U.S. v. Hugs, 
two Native Americans were convicted of violating 16 U.S.C. § 668(a), which 
protects bald and golden eagles as endangered species.92  The defendants 
asserted that they trapped, shot at, and killed eagles because “they were seeking 
 
 83. 913 P.2d 909 (Cal. 1996). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 912. 
 86. Id. at 925. 
 87. Id. at 928. 
 88. Id. at 919. 
 89. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531-32 (1993). 
 90. U.S. v. Hugs, 109 F.3d 1375 (9th Cir. 1997); U.S. v. Lundquist, 932 F. Supp. 1237 (D. Or. 
1996). 
 91. Lundquist, 932 F. Supp. at 1238. 
 92. Hugs, 109 F.3d at 1377. 
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eagle feathers and parts for their own religious practices . . . .”93  The Bald and 
Golden Eagle Protection Act allowed Native Americans the opportunity to 
apply for a permit to kill eagles.94  Neither defendant ever applied for the permit, 
claiming that the procedures for legal permission were onerous and so untimely 
that the season to hunt the eagles would already have passed by the time the 
permit was granted.95  The court decided that, although the believers were 
burdened in their religious practices, the bird-protection statute reflected “the 
importance” of protecting eagles “because of their [religious] significance to 
Native Americans.”96  Similarly, practical rules, such as the one formulated by 
the governor of Illinois, requiring pharmacists to dispense emergency 
contraceptives, should pass constitutional muster, although such rules could 
somewhat burden pharmacists’ religious practices.97 
The right to refuse to dispense contraceptives, especially emergency 
contraceptives, is analogous to the protection afforded to the rights of pro-life 
activists.  As one author notes: “In the context of abortion clinics, the right of 
anti-abortion protest to express dissent comes into direct conflict with the right 
of women and men to freely enter the clinics, seek counsel, or report for work.”98  
As with conscientiously objecting pharmacists, “[m]any forms of abortion 
protest are underscored by a religious timbre, as many people believe 
themselves called to such action to fulfill their religious obligations.”99 
The First Amendment stipulates that “Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof . . . .”100  However, the Establishment Clause is comprised of two 
conceptually different notions: the freedom to believe, and the freedom to act on 
those beliefs.  The first notion is absolute, while the second can never be absolute 
due to important competing considerations.  The Court itself has characterized 
the First Amendment as “opaque.”101  It has never been easy to parse the two 
parts of religious adherence—faith and action—the Court has always had to 
choose one value over another.  For example, the Court decided over a century 
ago that the government may prohibit polygamy even if indulgence in it is 
based upon a religious belief.102  The Court found that conservative right-minded 
men, while possibly finding polygamy salacious, were deviant if they practiced 
 
 93. Id. 
 94. 16 U.S.C. § 668(a) (2000). 
 95. Hugs, 109 F.3d at 1378. 
 96. Id. 
 97. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text. 
 98. Richard Albert, Protest, Proportionality, and the Politics of Privacy: Mediating the Tension 
Between the Right of Access to Abortion Clinics and Free Religious Expression in Canada and The United 
States, 27 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 7 (2005). 
 99. Id. at 8.  See also Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994) (upholding but 
modifying a state court injunction that did not provide a protective buffer zone at an abortion clinic). 
 100. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 101. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971). 
 102. Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. U.S., 136 U.S. 1 (1890); 
Reynolds v. U.S., 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
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it.  It also held that “the state has a right to prohibit polygamy and all other open 
offenses against the enlightened sentiment of mankind.”103 
Recently, in Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court,104 the 
California Supreme Court rejected First Amendment challenges to the state’s 
compulsory contraceptive health insurance coverage law.  Catholic Charities, as 
a religious employer whose tenets of faith oppose birth control, claimed a 
constitutional right to refuse such insurance.105  The Women’s Equity in 
Contraception Act was, according to the court, “enacted in 1999 to eliminate 
gender discrimination in health care benefits and to improve access to 
prescription contraceptives.”106  Evidence before the legislature revealed that 
women during their reproductive years spent as much as sixty-eight percent 
more than men in out-of-pocket health care costs, due in large part to the cost of 
prescription contraceptives and the various costs of unintended pregnancies, 
including health risks, premature deliveries and increased neonatal care.107  The 
statute required employers who provided any type of  health insurance to cover 
contraceptive services, but relieved from such obligation all tax-exempt religious 
employers who have as their purpose “the inculcation of religious values” and 
primarily employ and serve persons sharing those tenets.108  Catholic Charities 
had to concede that it did not fit the law’s definition of a religious employer, 
since it served primarily as a non-denominational social service agency with a 
religiously-diverse workforce.109  As a freedom of religion challenge, the Court 
found that neither an Establishment, nor Free Exercise concern existed.110  At 
least in California, and at least for the time being, a Roman Catholic-sponsored 
entity must insure its own employees against the cost of birth control, despite 
religious doctrine that forbids birth control and abortion.111 
Debates about conscience clauses, or refusals to provide care on ethical and 
moral grounds, are not new.  States have had mandates for care and coverage 
for years, and both state and federal courts have heard a myriad of cases 
attempting to balance and accommodate.  What makes the current controversy 
so important is that there are now more impediments than ever to women’s 
relatively newly-recognized rights to privacy, which give them the 
constitutional right to make family choices.  Opponents of laws mandating that 
pharmacists fill prescriptions, like Luke Vander Bleek, argue that an 
“individual’s interest in getting this prescription is not greater than my interest 
 
 103. Church of Jesus Christ, 136 U.S. at 50. 
 104. 85 P.3d 67 (Cal. 2004). 
 105. Id. at 76. 
 106. Id. at 74. 
 107. Id. at 73; see Ann Kurth et al., Guttmacher Inst., Women’s Health Care Costs and Experiences, 
FAM. PLANNING PERSP., July-Aug. 2001, at 153, 153, available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/ 
journals/3315301.pdf . 
 108. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367.25 (West 2004); see also Catholic Charities, 85 P.3d at 
76 (explaining that an employer could avoid providing contraceptives by not offering prescription 
coverage at all). 
 109. Catholic Charities, 85 P.3d at 76. 
 110. Id. at 94. 
 111. Id. at 95. 
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in preserving my right to conscientious objection.”112  Only a constitutional 
challenge to the particular operation of a conscience clause at a drugstore can 
prove that statement to be false. 
The American Pharmacists Association has tried to create its own balance.  
Its publications recommend that pharmacists should be allowed to excuse 
themselves from dispensing drugs in situations that they find morally 
objectionable, but that such a decision must be accompanied by responsibility to 
the patient and performance of certain professional duties.113  The Association 
suggests that the patient be referred to another pharmacist or be channeled into 
another available health system.114  The official policy of the Association 
“supports the ability of pharmacists to step away from participating in an 
activity to which they have personal objections, but not [to] step in the way.”115 
Approximately eighty percent of Americans feel that a pharmacist should 
be forced to fill birth control prescriptions, notwithstanding their own personal 
or religious beliefs.116  The other twenty percent support the view that 
pharmacists should not be required to fill prescriptions to which they object.  
Illustrating the range of reasons for disagreement with contraception, 
professional pharmacists have acted upon sexist, moral, social, or purely 
antisocial motives.  Not only have pharmacists refused to fill prescriptions, they 
have also refused to transfer prescriptions or provide referrals.117  Furthermore, 
pharmacists have also displayed aggressive behavior in order to dissuade 
women from obtaining birth control prescriptions.  These actions constitute 
conduct that conflicts with the ethical guidelines governing health care 
professionals.118 
A significant part of this continuing conflict of rights would be moot, had 
the government followed its own recommendation that emergency 
contraception be available without a prescription.  For longer than a decade, the 
FDA had been considering the safety and desirability of emergency 
contraception119—essentially just a cocktail of regular birth control pills taken in 
heavier doses.120  In a notice published in the Federal Register on February 25, 
1997, the FDA announced the results of its research that post-coital drugs were 
safe and effective methods of contraception, explaining further that it hoped “to 
 
 112. See Gretchen Ruethling, Pharmacist Sues Over Contraceptive Rule, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2005, at 
A1. 
 113. News Release, John A. Gans, Executive Vice-President & CEO, Am. Pharmacists Ass’n, 
Pharmacists & Physicians: Not Just a Matter of Conscience (June 5, 2005), available at 
http://www.aphanet.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home&CONTENTID=3687&TEMPLATE=/
CM/ContentDisplay.cfm. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. News Release, Rebecca Wind, Guttmacher Inst., Health Care Providers Cross the Line When 
They Obstruct Women’s Access to Legal Medication (Aug. 3, 2005), http://www.agi-usa.org/ 
media/nr/2005/08/02/index.html. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Marian Lee, When Plan A Fails, We Need Plan B: Over-the-Counter Access to Emergency 
Contraceptive Pills 5 (Apr. 2004) (unpublished law school paper, Harvard University, on file at 
http://leda.law.harvard.edu/leda/data/677/Lee.rtf). 
 120. Id. at 2. 
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encourage manufacturers to make this additional contraceptive option 
available.”121  By late 2003, emergency contraception was expected to be 
approved as a non-prescription contingency technique for preventing pregnancy 
after unprotected sex or the failure of regular contraception.  However, by 
Spring 2004, the acting director of the FDA, Steven Galson, had refused to 
approve the application by Barr-Pharmaceuticals to produce just such an over-
the counter emergency contraception, called Plan B.122  The FDA’s rejection was 
directly contrary to the recommendations of its own, prestigious, physician-
packed advisory panel, that voted “overwhelmingly in favor of making 
emergency contraceptives easily available.”123  There were allegations by 
abortion rights proponents that the FDA’s reversal of position reflected a 
deferral to partisan supporters of the Bush Administration who strongly oppose 
emergency contraception in any form.124 
In explaining why Plan B was rejected, an FDA official stated that the pill 
could not be approved because the manufacturer had failed to consider the 
effects of using over-the-counter contraception on teenage girls, specifically 
those eleven to fourteen years of age.125  Leading FDA scientists publicly 
criticized this rationale on two grounds: (1) that this concern for a particular 
class of fertile women, the younger teens, had never arisen in the agency’s 
considerations of any other birth control drugs, and (2) that advisory panelists 
had already concluded there was no reason to assume that the drugs would 
actually be any less safe for that age group.126  The American Public Health 
Association joined the professional community’s outcry against the federal 
agency’s action.  The organization strongly advocated education about, and easy 
access to, emergency contraception.127  The Association’s findings included data 
that fifty percent of all pregnancies are unintended and approximately half of 
those unintended pregnancies are aborted.128  Importantly, especially for anti-
abortion activists who may also oppose birth control, “50% of unintended 
pregnancies could be avoided if women had the information and timely-access 
to emergency contraception.”129  Although the Bush Administration promised 
timely reconsideration of the possibility of changing the distribution status of 
the “morning-after” pill from a prescription drug to an over-the-counter drug, 
the Administration has so far failed to act.130  Senators and many FDA staff were 
 
 121. Prescription Drug Products; Certain Combined Oral Contraceptives for Use as Postcoital 
Emergency Contraception, 62 Fed. Reg. 8609, 8610 (Feb. 25, 1997). 
 122. Liza Mundy, Dubious Conceptions, SLATE, June 1, 2004, http://www.slate.com/id/2101525. 
 123. Id. 
 124. See, e.g., Marc Kaufman, Abortion Foe to Be Reappointed to FDA Panel; Four Lawmakers Tell 
Bush That Doctor Has ‘Allowed His Personal Views to Overshadow His Duty,’ WASH. POST, June 29, 2004, 
at A6. 
 125. Marc Kaufman, Staff Scientists Reject FDA’s Plan B Reasoning, WASH. POST, June 18, 2004, at 
A2. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Press Release, Am. Pub. Health Ass’n, American Public Health Association Renews Call for 
Improving Access to Emergency Contraception (May 11, 2004), http://apha.org/news/press/2004/ 
womens_health_week.htm. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Regulating the Drug Industry: The Merry Go-Round, ECONOMIST, Oct. 1, 2005, at Business 1. 
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dismayed and worried “that politics had trumped scientific evidence.”131  In 
response to the Administration’s inaction, a high-ranking FDA director 
resigned, explaining that she refused to work at the FDA “when scientific and 
clinical evidence . . . has been overruled.”132 
Despite the protests of certain pharmacists, most medical professionals and 
the FDA believe that emergency contraception is not abortion.  The American 
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists defines the beginning of pregnancy 
as the “completed implantation of fertilized egg in the womb.”133  Interestingly, 
the FDA’s policy has also been that pregnancy begins with implantation.134  Even 
Carolyn Gerster, physician and past president of the National Right to Life 
Committee, did not oppose the FDA’s approval of emergency contraception as a 
prescribed drug.135  She explained that, “emergency contraception . . . prevents, 
but does not end pregnancy.  Nobody dies with contraception.”136  Furthermore, 
a Kaiser Family Foundation survey conducted in 1995 found that eighty-four 
percent of doctors who opposed abortion on moral or religious grounds did not 
oppose emergency contraception.137  In fact, within this same group of doctors, 
forty-eight percent of them had prescribed emergency contraceptives at least 
once in the past year.138  Even among religious or ethnic groups with strong 
moral opposition to abortion, accurate information about emergency 
contraception obviated opposition to their use.139 
In Brownfield v. Daniel Freeman Marina Hospital, a California court held that 
a state law exempting religious institutions from participating in abortions did 
not give a Catholic hospital the right to refuse to provide emergency 
contraception information to a rape victim.140  There, the plaintiff’s mother had 
specifically requested, on her daughter’s behalf, information about emergency 
contraception from the hospital emergency room staff and the staff had refused 
to provide such information.141  The court agreed with the plaintiff that because 
 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Renee C. Wyser-Pratte, Protection of RU-486 as Contraception, Emergency Contraception and as 
an Abortifacient Under the Law of Contraception, 79 OR. L. REV. 1121, 1131-32 (2000). 
 134. Gina Kolata, Debate on Selling Morning-After Pill Over the Counter, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2003, 
at A1.  See U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., FDA’S DECISION REGARDING PLAN B: QUESTIONS AND 
ANSWERS (2004) (“Plan B works like other birth control pills to prevent pregnancy by stopping the 
release of an egg from the ovary (ovulation).  It may prevent the union of sperm and egg 
(fertilization).  If fertilization does occur, Plan B may prevent a fertilized egg from attaching to the 
womb (implantation).  If a fertilized egg is implanted prior to taking Plan B, Plan B will not work.”). 
 135. Sandra G. Boodman, The ‘Morning-After’ Kit: New Emergency Contraceptive Gives Women a 
Second Chance to Prevent Pregnancy, WASH. POST, Sept. 22, 1995, at Z12. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Sandra G. Boodman, Emergency Contraception: ‘Morning-After’ Pill Has Long Been Available but 
Many Women Don’t Know About It, WASH. POST, Apr. 4, 1995, at Z07. 
 138. Id. 
 139. See Laura F. Romo et al., The Role of Misconceptions on Latino Women’s Acceptance of Emergency 
Contraceptive Pills, 69 CONTRACEPTION 227, 233 (2004) (finding, for instance, that low-income 
Hispanic women who were uninformed about the chemistry and mechanism of emergency 
contraception were more likely to have moral qualms about its use). 
 140. 256 Cal. Rptr. 240, 244 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989). 
 141. Id. at 242. 
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emergency contraception does not constitute abortion, the hospital was 
obligated to provide information about the morning-after pill.142  The court 
decided that withholding such information could ultimately violate the victim’s 
constitutional right to choice, stating that the duty to disclose such information 
arises from the fact that an adult of sound mind has “the right, in the exercise of 
control over [her] own body, to determine whether or not to submit to lawful 
medical treatment.”143 
IV.  HOW WOMEN WORK AND WHAT THEY EARN 
Ostensibly, fair or equal opportunity for women in the workplace is a 
national priority.144  Nonetheless, the workplace is the most startling example of 
hierarchy and gender discrimination.  The female workforce has yet to achieve 
pay equity.  A typical woman earns no more than four-fifths of what an average 
man makes for doing the same work and having the same qualifications.145  
Women aged thirty-five and older earn about three-fourths as much as their 
male peers.146  The average weekly difference in salaries of men and women with 
college and post-graduate degrees is approximately $300.147  Measurable and 
harmful differences persist across occupations: Women doctors average $989 a 
week, while men are paid $1677 for the same number of hours, and male post-
secondary teachers earn $1111 a week, compared to women’s weekly pay of 
$878 for their college teaching.148  Female computer programmers earn an 
average of $973 a week, compared with an average of $1115 for men.149  Even 
where salaries are established by local, state or federal law, there are gendered 
differences, albeit smaller ones.150  It has been estimated that “taking into account 
women’s lower work hours and their years with zero earnings due to family 
care . . . the average prime age working woman earned only $273,592 while the 
average man earned $722,693, a difference of 62%.151 
In 2003, 29.4% of women earned poverty-level wages or less, compared 
with 19.6% of men.152  Median incomes in 1999 based upon household type were 
 
 142. Id. at 244. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Heather S. Dixon, National Daycare: A Necessary Precursor to Gender Equality with Newfound 
Promise for Success, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 561, 563 n.16 (2005). 
 145. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, HIGHLIGHTS OF WOMEN’S EARNINGS 
IN 2003, REPORT NO. 978, at 1 (2004), available at http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpswom2003.pdf. 
 146. Id. at 1-2. 
 147. Id.; see also Am. Ass’n of Univ. Women, Gains in Learning, Gaps in Earnings: A Guide to 
State and National Data, http://www.aauw.org/research/statedata/index.cfm (last visited Nov. 18, 
2005) (finding that a typical female college-graduate, working full-time, annually earns $17,600 less 
than the average male college-graduate). 
 148. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, supra note 145, at 12 tbl.2. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 13-15 tbl.2.  For instance, mail carriers average only a 2.2% wage difference between 
genders; police officers approximately 5%; and public school teachers slightly less than 10%.  Id. 
 151. STEPHEN ROSE & HEIDI HARTMANN, INST. FOR WOMEN’S POLICY RESEARCH, STILL A MAN’S 
LABOR MARKET: THE LONG-TERM EARNINGS Gap, at iii (2004), http://www.iwpr.org/pdf/C355. 
 152. ECON. POLICY INST., STATE OF WORKING AMERICA 2004/2005, FACTS & FIGURES: WOMEN 2 
(2005), available at http://www.epinet.org/books/swa2004/news/swafacts_women.pdf. 
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much more meager for “female-headed” households. 153  The median income for 
married couples was $57,345.154  Male householders with children and an absent 
wife had a median income of $30,472.155  Female householders with children and 
an absent husband had a median income of $25,458.156  Families maintained by 
women tend to be poorer during the woman’s working life, and this situation is 
exacerbated as the woman ages.157  Although this is more common among 
minority populations, it is generally fairly predictable across races, counting for 
gender alone.  Furthermore, while never-married women are poor, surprisingly, 
divorced and widowed women are even poorer.158  The National Center on 
Women and Family Law in New York reports that in the first year of divorce, 
women generally suffer a 73% reduction in their standard of living, while their 
ex-husbands enjoy a 42% increase, on average.159  Older housewives and women 
who are married for long periods of time experience the greatest downward 
mobility and the greatest relative deprivation after divorce.160  Income, by itself, 
is not the sole predictor of poverty for women.  Healthcare expenses, for which 
many women have no private insurance, also force women into poverty.161 
Women’s poverty is perhaps one of the most intractable elements of the 
American workplace.  Although the Equal Pay Act was passed in 1963, in 1979 
women earned approximately 63% of what men earned.162  In 1999, according to 
the Department of Labor, women earned 76.5% of their male counterparts in 
full-time jobs.163  Note, again, that these are averages.  College-educated women 
with high salaries and some white males with low salaries, contributed to that 
 
 153. See U.S. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, QT-P32 Income Distribution in 1999 
of Households and Families: 2000, http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/QTTable?_bm=y&-
geo_id=01000US&-qr_name=DEC_2000_SF3_U_QTP32&-ds_name=DEC_2000_SF3_U&-_lang=en&-
_sse=on (last visited Mar. 1, 2006) . 
 154. Id.  
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. See generally Regina Gallindo Carter, Pro Bono Legal Services: A Focus on the Elderly and 
Disabled, 60 TEX. B.J. 270 (1997) (describing free legal services available to help elderly women in 
these positions); see also U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, supra note 145, at 27-
29 tbl.11-12. 
 158. Jacqueline DeWarr, Annotated Bibliography: Women and Aging, http://www.neln.org/ 
bibs/geerken.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2005).  In 1995, approximately 47% of all older women were 
widows.  In addition, there were 5 times as many widows (8.6 million) as widowers (1.7 million).  
Since 1990, the number of divorced women has increased approximately 4 times faster than the 
number of divorcees among the older population as a whole.  Id. 
 159. Joan Pennington, The Economic Implications of Divorce for Older Women, 23 CLEARINGHOUSE 
REV. 488, 489 (1989). 
 160. Id. 
 161. 80% of retirement age women have no access to pensions, 60% of women over sixty-five 
living alone have social security as their only income, and 4 million mid-life women have no health 
insurance.  DeWarr, supra note 158. 
 162. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,  DEPT. OF LABOR,, supra note 145, at 1. 
 163. Jewel E. Partridge et al., Similar Education Doesn’t Mean Equal Pay for Women, FLA. ST. U. 
WIRE, Dec. 7, 2000.  The average for all women is 77 cents for every dollar that men earn; for African 
American and Hispanic women the gap is even greater: 66 cents and 56 cents, respectively.  Id.  
However, these numbers do not suggest that women of color earn more; the fact that men of color 
earn less accounts for the difference. 
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average.164  In truth, most women earned significantly less than 75% of what 
most men earn and women of unique (and overlapping) subsets present an even 
starker contrast. 
Today, 57% of all enrolled undergraduates are women, 66% of black 
undergraduates are women, and 60% of the Latino undergrads are women.165  
Despite their disproportionate educational qualifications, women earn less.  Half 
of all women work in traditionally female, low-paying jobs without pensions.166  
In fact, “[w]omen hold the majority (59%) of low-wage jobs and are much more 
likely to be paid lower wages than male workers.”167  Not all women who are 
paid low wages work part-time, nor are they all young: 31% of women of prime 
working ages (between the ages of 25 and 45) worked full-time and were paid 
low wages.168 
The Women’s Institute for a Secure Retirement summarizes working 
women’s positions with these facts: 2 out of 3 working women earn less than 
$30,000.169  That is less than $15 per hour—an amount considered a touchstone in 
predicting whether workers receive health benefits; better paid employees have 
better benefits.170  Assuming women earn $0.76 for every $1 earned by men, they 
experience a lifetime loss of over $300,000.171 
Low-wage jobs (at which many of our mothers work) include: bank tellers, 
receptionists, clerks, household workers, nurses’ aids, certified nursing 
assistants, duplicating machine operators, retail sales clerks, food service 
workers, cleaning ladies and building services.  Part-time workers constitute 
33% of all low-wage workers; 54% of part-time workers are likely to receive low 
 
 164. More women than men graduate from college.  Nat’l Ctr. for Educ., Statistics, Degrees 
Conferred by Sex and Race, http://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=72 (last visited Mar. 1, 
2006).  Since 1994, women have earned more than 50% of all associate, bachelor and master degrees 
awarded; Women accounted for 39% of all PhD’s.  Id.  In 1994, minorities comprised 31% of the U.S. 
population, but earned only 19.4% of the bachelor degrees, 14.6% of the master degrees, and 12.1% 
of the doctorate degrees.  Id.  Hispanic students earned 5.5% of the bachelor degrees, 4.1% of the 
master degrees, and 3.2% of the doctorate degrees.  Id.  Relative figures for students denominated 
Asian or Pacific Islander are 6.0%, 8.0%, and 7.7%.  Id.  Each set of figures suggests that, if education 
matters, the wage gap between white men and all other groups should be smaller than it is in reality. 
 165. CATHERINE FREEMAN, NAT’L CTR . FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, TRENDS IN EDUCATIONAL EQUITY OF 
GIRLS AND WOMEN  2004, at 80 (2004). 
 166. See No Turning Back: The Feminist Resource Website, Women and Work in the U.S., 
http://ntb.stanford.edu/data.html#WomenWelfare (last visited Nov. 20, 2005). 
 167. Marlene Kim, Women Paid Low Wages: Who They Are and Where They Work, MONTHLY LAB. 
REV., Sept. 2000, at 26.  The current population survey defines low wage workers as “those workers 
who could not support a family of four above the government’s official poverty level while working 
fifty-two weeks per year, forty hours per week for a total of 2080 hours per year.”  For workers paid 
on an hourly basis, this means that low wage workers are defined as those who were paid no more 
than $7.91 per hour or $16,450 for 2080 hours of work in 1998. 
 168. Id. at 27 tbl.1. 
 169. Welcome to the WISER Website, http://www.wiser.heinz.org/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2006). 
 170. Lorraine Schmall, Women and Pension Reform: Economic Insecurity and Old Age, 35 J. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 673 (2002). 
 171. Press Release, Heinz Family Philanthropies/Women’s Inst. for a Secure Retirement, 2005 
National Women’s Retirement Survey Results (May 4, 2005), available at http://www.wiser.heinz. 
org/pollpressrelease0505.pdf (statistics calculated using National Women’s Retirement Survey 
Results findings). 
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wages, compared with 24% of all full-time workers.172  68% of women who 
received low wages were not covered by employer-provided health insurance 
during 1997,173 and, starkly, “one-third of women who are paid low-wages live 
below 150% of the poverty level.”174 
Job segregation by sex appears to be changing glacially, if at all.  The U.S. 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has a mandate to collect 
data from public and private employers about the composition of their work 
forces by sex, race, and ethnicity.  More white men than any other group work 
in jobs most commonly associated with higher wages and employee benefits.  
For example, in 1998, 87.4% of all “craft workers” were male; 79.3% of all craft 
workers were white.175  In 2003, the percentages were barely changed; 87.1% of 
craft workers were male, and 76.1% of all craft workers were white.176  Even 
within categories, there is gender segregation.  The Department of Labor 
observes that women were “much less likely than men to be employed in some 
of the highest paying fields . . . .”177 
A study conducted in 1991 by the Economic Policy Institute and the 
Institute for Women’s Policy Research showed that 59.7% of the 8.4 million 
workers who would receive a pay increase as the result of a higher minimum 
wage were women.178  Simply increasing the minimum wage to $12,300 per year 
for full-time workers “would help to reduce the overall pay gap between 
women and men,” because so many women earn wages at that level.179  Even 
more current data shows that 15.3% of married females with children, and 9.2% 
of single working mothers would benefit from an increase in the minimum 
wage.180  Almost half (48%) of all minimum wage workers are full-time 
workers.181 
The relative poverty remains throughout a woman’s life.  One study in 
1999 found that “the typical married couple looks forward to around one-half 
 
 172. Id. at 29. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, OCCUPATIONAL EMPLOYMENT IN PRIVATE 
INDUSTRY BY RACE/ETHNIC GROUP/SEX AND BY INDUSTRY tbl.1 (1998), http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/ 
jobpat/1998/tables-1.html. 
 176. U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, OCCUPATIONAL EMPLOYMENT IN PRIVATE 
INDUSTRY BY RACE/ETHNIC GROUP/SEX AND BY INDUSTRY tbl.1 (2003), http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/ 
jobpat/2003/national.html. 
 177. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEPT. OF LABOR, supra note 145, at 2. 
 178. JARED BERNSTEIN & JOHN SCHMITT, ECON. POLICY INST., THE IMPACT OF THE MINIMUM WAGE: 
POLICY LIFTS WAGES, MAINTAINS FLOOR FOR LOW-WAGE LABOR MARKET 6 tbl.1 (2000), available at 
http://www.epi.org/briefingpapers/minwage-0627/min_wage_bp.pdf. 
 179. JARED BERNSTEIN & JOHN SCHMITT, ECON. POLICY INST., THE MINIMUM WAGE INCREASE: A 
WORKING WOMAN’S ISSUE 1 (1999), available at http://www.epinet.org/issuebriefs/ib133.pdf. 
 180. Id. at 9 tbl.3.  As of 1998, almost 7 million women would benefit from a proposed minimum 
wage increase.  Id. at 3 tbl.2.  Of those women, 96.1% would be nonunion employees, as opposed to 
3.9% of union workers for whom a minimum wage increase would help.  Id.  In addition, updated 
findings suggest that “while African-Americans represent 11.7% of the overall workforce, they 
represent 15.7% of those affected by an increase; similarly, 10.8% of the total workforce is Hispanic, 
compared to 19.2% of those who would be affected by an increase.”  Id. at 7. 
 181. Id. at 1. 
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million dollars in retirement assets . . . and the median non-married woman 
about $160,000.”182  According to a more recent survey sponsored by the Heinz 
Family Philanthropies, nearly 40% of all women between the ages of 30 and 55 
are worried they will live at or near the poverty level in their “golden” years, 
because current income does not allow them to save for retirement.  The figures 
increase dramatically to 53% for women of color.  A summary of the report 
concludes: “Retirement is a myth for the majority of women in this country.”183 
The added tragedy of the less than equal wage is that women head an 
overwhelming majority of single-parent families.184  Almost 40% of minimum 
wage workers are the sole source of income for their households.185  If women 
received the same pay as men who have the same education, union status and 
age, and live in the same region of the country, their household income would 
rise by $4000.186 
Researchers have repeatedly found that wage differentials exist even after 
controlling for “differences in characteristics likely to be related to worker 
productivity, such as age, education, and labor market experience.”187  Although 
gender discrimination is illegal—and dramatically less pervasive than it once 
was—it remains the only explanation for at least part of the wage gap, which 
illustrates “the fallacy that merit alone determines employment success.”188 
Discrimination, far from disappearing, actually seems to be on the rise.  
EEOC Chair Cari Dominguez responded to recent statistics, concluding that 
“discrimination continues to be a problem in too many of today’s workplaces.”189  
In 2003, there were 81,293 private sector charges of discrimination filed with the 
Commission.  30% of the charges alleged gender discrimination, and 1167 
charges were based upon an employer violation of the 1963 Equal Pay Act.190  
Although it is not clear why these data were gathered separately, there were 
13,566 sexual harassment charges and 4,649 pregnancy discrimination charges 
 
 182. Phillip B. Levine, Olivia S. Mitchell & John W. Philips, Worklife Determinants of Retirement 
Income Differentials Between Men and Women 21 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
7243, 1999), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w7243. 
 183. See Press Release, Heinz Family Philanthropies/Women’s Inst. for a Secure Retirement, 
supra note 171, at 2. 
 184. Jacqueline Kirby, Single Parent Families in Poverty, HUM. DEV. & FAM. LIFE BULL., Spring 1995, 
at 1, available at http://www.hec.ohio-state.edu/famlife/bulletin/volume.1/bulletin.htm (90% of 
single families headed by women). 
 185. CTR. FOR POLICY ALTERNATIVES & LIFETIME TELEVISION, WOMEN’S VOICES 2000: ANALYSIS OF 
FINDINGS FROM A NATIONWIDE SURVEY AND FOCUS GROUP 33 (2001), available at 
http://paidleave.org/docs/108_WomensVoices2000.pdf (discussing analysis by Lake, Small, Perry 
& Associates, American Viewpoint, and Linda Faye Williams, University of Maryland at College 
Park and Insight Research). 
 186. Nat’l Org. for Women, Facts About Pay Equality, available at http://www.now.org/ 
issues/economic/factsheet.html (last visited Dec. 6, 2005). 
 187. Levine et al., supra note 182, at 2. 
 188. Anne Lawton, The Meritocracy Myth and the Illusion of Equal Employment Opportunity, 85 
MINN. L. REV. 587, 587 (2000). 
 189. Press Release, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n, EEOC Issues: Fiscal Year 2003 
Enforcement Data (Mar. 8, 2004), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/press/3-8-04.html. 
 190. Id. 
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filed.191  These numbers remain fairly constant.  In the fiscal year 2000, 79,896 
charges were filed at the Commission: 36.2% of these were based on allegations 
of race discrimination; 31.5% on gender; 9.8% on national origin.  Separate 
charges filed, alleging that employers retaliated against their workers for 
complaining about discrimination, include 1270 complaints based upon 
protections women demanded under the Equal Pay Act.192 
In addition, the accoutrements of motherhood place unique demands upon 
workers with children.  Conservative economists note that work data illustrates 
the agency of women to choose part-time and temporary work and to eschew 
better-paying jobs that require more hours or travel in order to accommodate 
their child-care needs and desires.  Such theorists find lower wages to be 
symptomatic of such choices.193  Even assuming that a woman’s choice to stay 
home with her children is among the causes of her lower wages, creating 
additional obstacles that make it difficult or impossible for her to plan a family 
only worsens her economic plight. 
Not only do women suffer a pay gap, but nearly half of them do not even 
have health insurance.  Over a recent 5-year period, “[t]he number of women in 
the United States who do not have insurance has grown 3 times faster than the 
number of men without health insurance.”194  In particular, minority women are 
woefully un- and under insured.195  The estimates on private health insurance 
coverage range from 53% for all women to 64% for adult, non-elderly women.196  
Nearly one-third of all women are insured as dependents by another primary 
insured.197 
 
 191. Id. 
 192. U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, CHARGE STATISTICS: FISCAL YEAR 1992-
FISCAL YEAR 2004, http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/charges.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2005).  Some of 
the major employment discrimination cases brought under either Title VII or the Equal Pay Act 
demonstrate that discrimination continues to exist.  For example, Eastman Kodak agreed to pay $13 
million in present or retroactive wages to employees who were underpaid on the basis of either race 
or gender.  In addition, since 1997 the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs has collected 
$10 million in equal pay settlements from such corporations as Texaco, U.S. Airways, Pepsi-Cola, 
Gateway, and Health Insure Highmark Inc.  Home Depot and Publix Supermarkets agreed to pay 
more than $80 million each to settle lawsuits based upon sex discrimination.  The Service Employees 
International Union Local 715 in Santa Clara, California won nearly $30 million on a claim for 4500 
county employees from secretaries to mental health counselors based on findings that some 150 job 
titles, performed by a consulting firm chosen jointly by the county and the union resulted in 
underpayment in job classes with more than 50% minorities such as licensed vocational nurses and 
beginning social workers; and that 70% of those positions were filled by women.  Id. 
 193. Manuelita Ureta, Women, Work and Family: Recent Economic Trends, 19 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 57 
(1998). 
 194. JEANNA M. LAMBREW, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, DIAGNOSING DISPARITIES IN HEALTH 
INSURANCE FOR WOMEN: A PRESCRIPTION FOR CHANGE 4 (2001). 
 195. See, e.g., J. Lee Hargraves, Ctr. for Studying Health System Change, The Insurance Gap and 
Minority Health Care: 1997-2001, TRACKING REP., June 2002, at 1, available at http://www.hschange. 
org/CONTENT/443/443.pdf. 
 196. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., WOMEN AND HEALTH CARE: A NATIONAL PROFILE 14 (2005), 
http://www.kff.org/womenshealth/upload/Women-and-Health-Care-A-National-Profile-Key-
Findings-from-the-Kaiser-Women-s-Health-Survey.pdf. 
 197. Id. 
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In 2005, the Kaiser Family Foundation issued a comprehensive report on 
women and healthcare.  Among its findings: 37% of poor women (family 
incomes below the poverty level) and 27% of near-poor women (100% to 199% 
of the poverty level) are uninsured.198  16% of women with incomes of 200-299% 
of the poverty level have no insurance.199  Medicaid covers only one-third of 
poor women.  38% of Latinas have no health insurance, compared to 13% of 
white women.  Only 39% of them have employer-sponsored health insurance, 
versus 70% of white women.  “Low-wage workers are less likely to be offered 
coverage by their employers and even when they are offered coverage, it is more 
difficult for them to afford the cost of premiums.”200  Women who are young, 
single and working part-time are the least likely to be insured.  From ages 18 to 
24, 17% have no insurance, while 21% of workers ages 25 to 34 and 26% of those 
ages 35 to 44 are insured.201  Interestingly, although not broken down by specific 
types of care denied, 23% of all women whose insurance denied coverage never 
received the prescribed medical care.202  30% of women aged 18 to 44 surveyed 
chose to forego medical care due to the prohibitive cost of that care.203  More 
women (8%) than men (5%) reported that they had to spend less on basic needs 
of the family in order to pay for prescription medicines.204  8 out of 10 women 
pay for prescriptions at least partially out-of-pocket every month; one-quarter 
pay at least $100 per month and 10% pay more than $200.205  Upon recent inquiry 
at a large chain pharmacy, registered pharmacist Yvonne Mei reported that the 
current prices of popular contraceptives are: $42.99 for Ortho Tri-Cyclen, $47.99 
for Ortho-Evra, and $67.69 for one bi-annual injection of Depo-Provera.206 
Despite the numbers of women who, in fact, have health insurance—
approximately half—it is necessary to focus upon those who do not.  These 
women are lower-paid, have no access to savings or retirement benefits, and 
may be in the greatest need of contraception.  “Half of uninsured women have 
dependent children and notably . . . 54% are employed.”207 
V.  WORKING FOR THE LARGEST PRIVATE EMPLOYER IN THE WORLD 
Wal-Mart, the global leader in retail and employment, exemplifies how 
women fare in many workplaces.  Few of its more than a million employees208 
opt for the company health insurance plan, which requires large self-paid 
premiums, or work in the types of positions that provide health care.  For 
 
 198. Id. at 15. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. at 16. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. at 24. 
 203. Id. at 28. 
 204. Id. at 29. 
 205. Id. at 30. 
 206. Interview with Yvonne Mei, Registered Pharmacist at Jewel/Osco, in Chicago, Ill. (July 19, 
2005). 
 207. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., supra note 196, at 17. 
 208. Anthony Bianco & Wendy Zellner, Is Wal-Mart Too Powerful?, BUS. WK., Oct. 6, 2003, at 100.  
Wal-Mart boasted a global workforce of 1.4 million and $245 billion in sales in 2002.  Id. 
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example, Wal-Mart reports that only 52% of the 80% of Wal-Mart employees in 
Maryland who are eligible for health insurance benefits—which require some 
employee contribution—have enrolled, leaving most Wal-Mart workers in the 
state uninsured.209 
Only recently did Wal-Mart’s in-store pharmacies begin to stock Plan B 
emergency contraceptives.  Ron Chumiuk, Vice President of Pharmacy for Wal-
mart, said in a statement that Wal-Mart changed its longstanding policy because 
“[w]e expected more states to require us to sell emergency contraceptives in the 
months ahead . . . [and since Plan B] is an FDA-approved product, we feel it is 
difficult to justify being the country’s only major pharmacy chain not selling 
it.”210  However, the company maintains its conscientious objection policy, which 
permits employees who do not feel comfortable dispensing a prescription to 
refer customers to another pharmacist or pharmacy.211 
Wal-Mart’s pay is low enough to qualify many for welfare.  In 2001, the 
average Wal-Mart worker earned $8.23 an hour, or $13,831 a year, below the 
$14,630 federal poverty level for a family of three.  Unions, legislators, and some 
media target Wal-Mart for directing employees to get public assistance for 
health insurance to reduce the company’s own expenditures.  For example, 
Maryland lawmakers drafted a mandate for any employers with more than ten 
thousand employees to either spend at least eight percent of their payroll on 
health benefits or put the money directly into the state’s health program for the 
poor.212 
The National Organization for Women (NOW) named Wal-Mart a 
“Merchant of Shame” because of the myriad of lawsuits filed and cases won 
against them, including inter alia sex discrimination, child labor law violations, 
overtime claims, anti-union animus, and its exclusion of contraception coverage 
from health plans.213  The two largest public school teachers unions joined a 
“back-to-school” boycott against Wal-Mart Stores and demanded “that the 
company boost its wages, expand health benefits and adhere to child-labor and 
discrimination laws.”214 
 
 209. John Wagner & Michael Barbaro, Md. Passes Rules on Wal-Mart Insurance: Bill Obligates Firms 
on Health Spending, WASH. POST, Apr. 6, 2005, at A1; see also AFL-CIO Working Families, Take the 
Wal-Mart Back-to-School Pledge, http://www.unionvoice.org/wa/alert-description.tcl?alert_id= 
1475014 (last visited Mar. 1, 2006). 
 210. News Release, Wal-Mart, Wal-Mart to Carry Plan B Emergency Contraception (Mar. 3, 
2006), http://walmartstores.com/GlobalWMStoresWeb/navigate.do?catg=512&contId=6075. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Wagner & Barbaro, supra note 209, A1.  “Wal-Mart’s image problems have had no 
measurable impact on consumers’ willingness to shop at the chain, analysts said.  Sales grew eleven 
percent last year and Wal-Mart estimates that ninety percent of Americans, or 270 million people, 
shopped at one of the company divisions in 2004.”  Id. 
 213. NAT’L ORG. FOR WOMEN, WAL-MART: MERCHANT OF SHAME (2005), available at 
http://www.now.org/issues/wfw/brochure.pdf; Wal-Mart Litigation Project, Tracking Litigation 
Against the World’s Largest Retailer, http://www.wal-martlitigation.com (last visited Nov. 20, 
2005); see also Corrie Pikul, Women vs. Wal-Mart, SALON, Nov. 22, 2004, (“American taxpayers chip in 
to pay for many full-time Wal-Mart employees because they usually require incremental health 
insurance, public housing, food stamps . . . .”); see generally LIZA FEATHERSTONE, SELLING WOMEN 
SHORT: THE LANDMARK BATTLE FOR WORKERS’ RIGHTS AT WAL-MART (2004). 
 214. Teachers Unions Join Boycott of Wal-Mart, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2005, at C4. 
07_SCHMALL.DOC 4/28/2006  8:56 AM 
170 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 13:139 2006 
Wal-Mart is defending the largest class action case since the civil rights law 
banning sex discrimination was passed in 1964.  The certified class “covers at 
least 1.5 million women who have been employed over the past five years.”215  
Wal-Mart unsuccessfully attempted to have the case—”the country’s biggest 
lawsuit claiming men were favored over women on the job”—and class 
certification, dismissed.216 
Brought in 2001, the suit claims that women earn an average of five to 
fifteen percent less than men holding the same jobs, arguing that “Wal-Mart 
cultivates and maintains a strong corporate culture which includes gender 
stereotyping,”217 that resulted directly in economic and professional 
disadvantage.  In addition, it alleges sex discrimination in the company-wide 
process of promotion: while women comprise two-thirds of the Wal-Mart 
workforce, men grossly outnumber women in management positions.218  
According to the court that approved the class: 
[L]argely uncontested descriptive statistics . . . show that women working in 
Wal-Mart stores are paid less than men in every region, that pay disparities exist 
in most job categories, that the salary gap widens over time even for men and 
women hired into the same jobs at the same time, that women take longer to 
enter into management positions, and that the higher one looks in the 
organization the lower percentage of women.219 
Not only are women underpaid and relegated to the bottom of the 
corporate heap, Wal-Mart’s health plan, which is voluntary, specifically 
excludes family planning expenses.  Wal-Mart’s women are among the pioneers 
who will force courts to decide whether exclusion from health coverage is 
legally-prohibited sex discrimination.  Today, most health plans except for Wal-
Mart’s do offer family-planning coverage,220 but only twenty-eight percent did so 
in 1993.221 
Inspired by a recent lawsuit, a female employee of Wal-Mart sought 
certification for a class of women who “used” or “wished to use” contraceptives 
and were denied reimbursement by Wal-Mart’s health plan.222  The court 
granted in part her motion to certify, excluding as too speculative the group of 
women who “wished to use” birth control.  In doing so, the court relied upon 
the first and perhaps most famous case alleging gender discrimination by an 
 
 215. Dukes v. Wal-Mart, 222 F.R.D. 137, 142 (N.D. Cal. 2004). 
 216. Joseph Menn, Wal-Mart Faces Tough Questioning for Judges; A Federal Appeals Panel Points Out 
Weaknesses in the Retailer’s Defense in a Sex Discrimination Suit, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2005, at C1. 
 217. Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 144. 
 218. Id. at 141. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Susan Stabile, State Attempts to Define Religion: The Ramifications of Applying Mandatory 
Prescription Contraceptive Coverage Statutes to Religious Employers, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 741, 748-
49 (2005). 
 221. Marc Kaufman, More Health Plans Cover Birth Control, WASH. POST, June 14, 2004, at A2. 
 222. Mauldin v. Wal-Mart, No. 1:01-CV-2755-JEC, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21024, at *19 (N.D. Ga. 
Aug. 23, 2002). 
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employer whose insurance coverage excluded contraceptive costs, Erickson v. 
Bartell Drug Co.223 
The Erickson case raised “an issue of first impression in the federal courts 
whether the selective exclusion of prescription contraceptives from defendant’s 
generally comprehensive prescription plan constitutes discrimination on the 
basis of sex.”224  Benefits have long been recognized as one of the emoluments of 
labor.225  The Erickson court characterized insurance coverage not as gratuitous, 
but rather as an earned entitlement, and found that a coverage exclusion that 
disparately affected women was illegal.226  Calling Title VII less than a model of 
clarity,227 the court perused the history of unfair and incorrect interpretations of 
the anti-discrimination laws, which have been slowly corrected by clarifying 
legislation and judicial decisions.228  Holding for the plaintiffs, Judge Lasnik 
wrote: 
What is clear from the law itself, its legislative history, and Congress’ 
subsequent actions, is that the goal of Title VII was to end years of 
discrimination in employment and to place all men and women, regardless of 
race, color, religion, or national origin, on equal footing in how they were 
treated in the workforce.”229 
Erickson’s lawyers claimed that denial of contraceptives which are needed 
because of a woman’s capacity to become pregnant violates the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act (PDA),230 and that the insurance plan was proof of disparate 
treatment.  The district court ruled in favor of Erickson, following the reasoning 
of the Supreme Court in UAW v. Johnson Controls,231 where the Court recognized 
that the capacity to become pregnant is a medical condition related to 
pregnancy.232  In that case, the UAW sued Johnson Controls over a company rule 
that prohibited fertile (potentially pregnant) women from working in certain 
jobs.  Without the ability to apply for and work in these jobs, women were 
denied the opportunity to advance within the firm.  The company said that it 
was concerned about high lead levels endemic to the proscribed jobs and that it 
was worried that fetuses could be exposed and harmed.233  The court countered 
that the firm failed to have similar concerns about the debilitating effect of lead 
exposure on the male reproductive system.234  The Erickson court relied on this 
 
 223. 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266 (W.D. Wash. 2001).  The plaintiffs argued that Bartell’s decision not to 
cover prescription contraceptives such as birth control pills, Norplant, Depo-Provera, intra-uterine 
devices, and diaphragms under its Prescription Benefit Plan for non-union employees violates Title 
VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978.  See id. 
 224. Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1268. 
 225. Inland Steel v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247, 251 (7th Cir. 1948). 
 226. Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1268, n.3. 
 227. Id. at 1269. 
 228. Id. at 1269-71. 
 229. Id. at 1269. 
 230. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000)). 
 231. 499 U.S. 187 (1991). 
 232. Id. at 199; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). 
 233. Id. at 190. 
 234. Id. at 198. 
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precedent and concluded that the employer’s health plan discriminated by 
excluding essential medication that controlled the “capacity to become 
pregnant.”235  The Supreme Court’s adoption of capacity to bear children (or not) 
as a proxy for sex helped the Erickson court rule in favor of the plaintiffs. 
Erickson’s second argument was a straightforward Title VII claim that the 
exclusion of contraceptives from an employer’s health plan has a disparate 
impact on women, because only women can become pregnant and only women 
bear the physical, emotional, and other consequences of an unintended 
pregnancy—or the financial burden of paying out of pocket for contraceptives.236  
The court did not reach the disparate impact issue, but it has since emerged in 
other cases.  A federal judge ruled in favor of Brandi Standridge, a twenty-
five-year-old engineer for Union Pacific from Pocatello, Idaho, and Kenya 
Phillips, a thirty-two-year-old engineer who lives near Kansas City, Missouri, 
who both brought Title VII claims about the railroad’s exclusion of birth control 
from its union-negotiated health insurance plan.  According to Judge Laurie 
Smith Camp, the health plan is discriminatory “because it treats medical care 
women need to prevent pregnancy less favorably than it treats medical care 
needed to prevent other medical conditions that are no greater threat to 
employees’ health than is pregnancy.”237 
Plaintiffs have tried other legal approaches to obtain contraceptive 
coverage.  In Glaubach v. Regence Blueshield,238 the court considered whether a 
particular interpretation of the state’s general state insurance law required 
coverage of contraception.  Specifically, plaintiffs contended that “the statutes 
impose a substantive obligation on those health carriers that provide a general 
prescription benefit to also specifically include all FDA approved contraceptive 
drugs and devices.”239  The court rejected the argument out of concern that its 
logical extension would mean that insurance carriers could not exclude any 
drug, for any reason—a nonsensible and impractical result.240  However, the 
judge discussed Erickson with approval and implied that federal and state sex 
discrimination prohibitions could mandate contraception coverage.241  Empirical 
data and observations by the parties in previous lawsuits explain that there are 
few litigated cases because most companies were “inspired” by Erickson.242 
 
 235. For an early, comprehensive treatment of the contraception exclusion as discrimination and, 
hierarchy, see Sylvia A. Law, Sex-Discrimination and Insurance for Contraception, 73 WASH. L. REV. 363 
(1998); for a more recent discussion, see Sharona Hoffman, AIDS Caps, Contraceptive Coverage, and The 
Law: An Analysis of the Federal Anti-Discrimination Statutes’ Applicability to Health Insurance, 23 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1315 (2002). 
 236. Colleen E. Medill, et al., Proceeding: Coverage of Reproductive Technologies Under Employer-
Sponsored Health Care Plans: Proceedings of the 2004 Annual Meeting, Association of American Law 
Schools, Sections on Employee Benefits and Employment Discrimination, 8 EMPL. RTS. & EMPLOY. POL’Y J. 
523, 532 (2004). 
 237. Judge: Railroad Must Cover Birth Control, USA TODAY, July 25, 2005, 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/2005-07-25-railroad-ruling-birth-control-coverage_x.htm. 
 238. 74 P.3d 115, 117 (Wash. 2003). 
 239. Id. at 117. 
 240. Id. at 118. 
 241. Id. at 119. 
 242. Medill, supra note 236, at 534 (Planned Parenthood has negotiated with Dow Jones, Publix, 
and Albertson’s, inter alia.). 
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Although it seems intuitive that employer health plans should not exclude 
benefits that only protect women, this conclusion was reached only after 
painfully long, and circuitous, litigation and legal amendment.  The Supreme 
Court considered a 1974 precursor cause of action in Geduldig v. Aiello.243  In this 
case, the Court made its infamous—and absurd—distinction in upholding a 
California law against equal protection challenges because it precluded 
disability payments for any condition related to pregnancy: 
The lack of identity between the excluded disability and gender as such under 
this insurance program becomes clear upon the most cursory analysis.  The 
program divides potential recipients into two groups—pregnant women and 
nonpregnant persons.  While the first group is exclusively female, the second 
includes members of both sexes.244 
It did not matter that forty-nine percent of the “non-pregnant persons” were 
biologically incapable of becoming pregnant.  The Court continued to allow 
pregnancy exclusions, which led to the passage of the Pregnancy Discrimination 
Act of 1978.245  Congressional debates before its passage highlight Congress’ 
concern.246  Legislative correction became the only way for women to climb to 
equal treatment. 
The Court’s 1976 decision in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert upheld against 
Title VII challenges an employer’s disability insurance policy that provided 
wage replacement for time lost due to almost any medical condition except 
pregnancy.247  The Court held that the exclusion was not sex discrimination 
because not all women are or will become pregnant.  There was no more 
showing here as there was in Geduldig that the exclusion of pregnancy disability 
benefits from petitioner’s plan was a pretext for discriminating against women, 
since pregnancy, though confined to women, “is in other ways significantly 
different from the typical covered disease or disability.”248  Moreover, there was 
no condition for which men received coverage but women did not.  The 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act clarifies the meaning of Title VII’s prohibition 
against sex discrimination: 
[T]he terms “because of sex” or “on the basis of sex” include, but are not limited 
to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical 
conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical 
conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, 
including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not 
so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work . . . .249 
 
 243. 417 U.S. 484 (1974). 
 244. Id. at 497. 
 245. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000). 
 246. H.R. Rep. No. 95-948, at 3 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4749, 4751 (“The 
assumption that women will become pregnant and leave the labor force leads to the view of women 
as marginal workers, and is at the root of the discriminatory practices which keep women in low-
paying and dead-end jobs.”). 
 247. 429 U.S. 125 (1976). 
 248. 429 U.S. at 136. 
 249. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000). 
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Just prior to Erickson, the EEOC issued a decision, in response to complaints 
from female employees at the United Parcel Service (UPS), concluding that Title 
VII is violated by any employer health plan that does not provide FDA 
approved prescription contraceptive methods for employees.250  In reaching this 
conclusion, the EEOC cited Congressional Hearings in which Senator Olympia 
Snowe remarked: “There is nothing ‘optional’ about contraception.  It is a 
medical necessity for women during 30 years of their lifespan.  To ignore the 
health benefits of contraception is to say that the alternative of 12 to 15 
pregnancies during a woman’s lifetime is medically acceptable.”251 
The EEOC agreed, extending the protection of the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act, an amendment to the original prohibition against sex 
discrimination, to cover contraception.  The EEOC concluded it was the only 
way “Congress could ensure that women would not be disadvantaged in the 
workplace, either because of their pregnancies or their ability to bear 
children.”252  By late Spring of 2005, at least twenty-four states had laws relating 
to insurance coverage for contraceptives.253  Most of these states require health 
insurance policies that cover prescription drugs to also cover prescription 
contraceptives.  Some laws prohibit such plans from excluding contraceptive 
services or supplies.  Thirteen states include an exemption for employers who 
object to such coverage for religious reasons.254  Three states include coverage 
exemptions for insurers affiliated with religious organizations in their policies.255  
Eleven states require employers to notify employees of their refusal to provide 
contraceptive coverage.  Federal legislation has been introduced covering the 
same matters.256 
Following one’s conscience can have an immediate and detrimental impact 
upon patients, customers and employees.  As the Supreme Court observed in its 
contraception cases, a refusal to provide contraception can lead to an unwanted 
pregnancy.  This observation may cause one to wonder whether the 
pharmacists’ moral objections are directed at other people’s behavior, or 
 
 250. U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, DECISION ON COVERAGE OF 
CONTRACEPTION (2004), http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/decision-contraception.html. 
 251. Id. at n.13. 
 252. Id.; see U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL, 
ANNUAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2002, http://www.eeoc.gov/litigation/02annrpt.html (last visited 
Nov. 20, 2005) (“UPS agreed to change the Plan to provide coverage for oral contraceptives 
prescribed for birth control or for other medical reasons on the same terms as other prescription 
drugs.  The company also agreed to pay the cost of oral contraceptives for three years to thirty-six 
employees affected by the policy.”); see also U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n, 
Pregnancy Discrimination, http://www.eeoc.gov/types/pregnancy.html (explanation of PDA 
violations) (last visited Nov. 20, 2005). 
 253. These states are: Arizona, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, 
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, 
North Carolina, Ohio, Rhode Island, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, Washington and West Virginia.  Nat’l 
Conference of State Legislatures, 50 State Summary of Contraceptive Laws, http://www.ncsl.org/ 
programs/health/50states.htm (last visited Aug. 3, 2005). 
 254. Id. (Arizona, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
Missouri, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, and Rhode Island). 
 255. Id. (Missouri, Nevada, and Texas). 
 256. The Equity in Prescription Insurance and Contraceptive Coverage Act of 2005, S. 1214, 109th 
Cong. (2005) (introduced). 
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whether their objections stem from having to perform an act that violates their 
own ethical or religious codes.  In the words of Judie Brown, the President of 
American Life League in Stafford, “I just absolutely do not believe that any 
company in the USA should be in the position of having to pay for birth control 
because females don’t want to accept responsibility for the possibility of being 
with child after they have sexual relations.”257 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Birth control is considered by most Americans to be essential.258  A woman 
cannot opt out of the need to control her fertility during the three decades prior 
to menopause without risking multiple pregnancies.  For some women with 
serious medical conditions, controlling their fertility is a matter of life or death.259  
Even without maternal disabilities, family planning is considered essential to the 
well-being of not only one family, but to general public health.  And it is 
desirable.  Attempts to control and prevent reproduction have characterized 
virtually every society of which we have records.260 
Beyond health considerations, reproductive self-determination has had not 
only the imprimatur of the Supreme Court, but continues to be an economic 
necessity for women who continue to work in a male model of employment.261  
The chief sponsor of the Senate bill that led to the PDA testified in Congress that 
“[b]ecause of their capacity to become pregnant, women have been viewed as 
marginal workers not deserving of the full benefits of compensation and 
advancement. . . .”262 
What mid-nineteenth century libertarians advocated and what 
jurisprudential statements seem to reflect―that birth control and family 
planning is a private issue from which government ought to withdraw―is not 
the reality of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.263  Although 
neither statutes nor judicial decisions addressed this issue before 1873, the 
ensuing centuries following its illegalization were marked by both.  What began 
as proactive litigation to secure the rights to privacy in family decision-making, 
bodily autonomy, and self-determination, evolved into lawmaking and law suits 
to limit those rights.  What became illegal in 1873 never became an absolute 
 
 257. Id.; see also Wagner & Barbaro, supra note 209; see also AFL-CIO WORKING FAMILIES, supra 
note 209. 
 258. A CBS/New York Times poll found that eighty percent of those surveyed believe a 
pharmacist should fill prescriptions for contraceptives, even if she or he has religious or moral 
objections.  Adam Sonfield, Rights v. Responsibilities: Professional Standards and Provider Refusals, 
GUTTMACHER REP. ON PUB. POL’Y, Aug. 2005, at 7, 9, available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/ 
tgr/08/3/gr080307.pdf. 
 259. Letter from Ralph W. Hale, M.D., Executive Vice President, American College of 
Obstetricians and Gynecologists, to Ida L. Castro, Chairwoman, Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission, (Jan. 27, 2000), available at http://lobby.la.psu.edu/013_Contraceptive_Coverage/ 
organizational_statements/American_College_of_Obstetricians_and_Gynecologists/ACOG_Letter_
to_the_Equal_Employment_Opportunity_Commission.htm. 
 260. See GORDON, supra note 8. 
 261. See Schmall, supra note 170, at 673. 
 262. 123 Cong. Rec. 29,385 (1977) (statement of Senator Williams). 
 263. See generally GORDON, supra note 8. 
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right thereafter.  The latest lawsuit-spawning controversy over ethical refusals to 
dispense birth control is the empirical result. 
It is not surprising, since the issue of contraception overlaps with the more 
complex issue of abortion.  Nearly one-third of the population considers the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade “a bad thing.”264  Readily available birth 
control should, under ideal circumstances, obviate abortion—at least in all but 
the most dire circumstances.265  The obstacles to legal and safe birth control went 
from its being criminal to being a constitutionally recognized right.  Insurance 
coverage for most women took over thirty years to catch up, even for those 
women, fewer than half, who have insurance.  Even for that small group, some 
pharmacies now refuse to fill prescriptions for contraceptives.  Many more 
refuse to provide emergency contraception, maintaining that such drugs are 
abortifacients.266  When economic self-determination has become a global 
priority, it is inexcusable that working women in America are still fighting for 
that very right, both at pharmacies and at the workplace. 
 
 264. Sonfield, supra note 258, at 8. 
 265. An overwhelming majority of Americans support abortions when a woman’s life is 
endangered (eighty-five percent); when a woman’s physical health is at risk (seventy-seven percent); 
and, when the pregnancy results from rape and incest (seventy-six percent).  See PollingReport.com, 
Abortion and Birth Control, 
CNN/USA Today /Gallup Poll (Jan. 10-12, 2003) http://www.pollingreport.com/abortion.htm. 
 266. The U.S. Food and Drug Administration disagrees, explaining that it “works like other birth 
control pills to prevent pregnancy. . . . [but] [i]f a fertilized egg is implanted prior to taking” the pills, 
it will not terminate the pregnancy.  U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA’S DECISION REGARDING PLAN B: 
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS (2004).  It seems incongruous that federal and state governments allow 
such refusals, considering that part of their national policy on welfare is to discourage births.  Under 
the nomenclature of welfare reform, Congress passed the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families 
Act (TANF) in 1996.  The purpose of the Act is described in 42 U.S.C. § 601(a) (2000): to, inter alia, 
“prevent and reduce the incidence of out-of-wedlock pregnancies and establish annual numerical 
goals for preventing and reducing the incidence of these pregnancies.”  Id.  The law grants flexibility 
to the states to achieve those goals, and allowed for the Mississippi policy that “penalizes welfare 
mothers with additional children.”  Pearson Liddell, Stevie Watson & William D. Eshee, Welfare 
Reform in Mississippi: TANF Policy and Its Implications, 11 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 1107, 1124 
(2003). 
